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REVIEW ESSAY
ACKERMANIA: THE QUEST FOR A COMMON LAW OF
HIGHER LAWMAKING
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS. By Bruce Ackerman. The

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Pp. 515. $29.95.
MICHAEL

J. GERHARDT*

INTRODUCTION

Almost twenty years ago, Bruce Ackerman, Sterling Professor
of Law and Political Science at Yale University, began an extraordinary journey. He set out to explain the dynamics of constitutional change. Along the way, he has authored several publications in which he has asserted the provocative thesis that the
Constitution does not provide the exclusive means for its formal
amendment.' Instead, Ackerman has maintained, our constitutional system allows the people, working in concert with their
elected national leaders, to amend the Constitution in enduring
ways other than through the formal procedures provided in

* Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. I am grateful to Dave
Douglas, Neil Kinkopf, Alan Meese, and Henry Monaghan for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1985); Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPoliticslConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453
(1989); Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking?, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUMONAL AMENDMENT 63 (Sanford Levinson ed.,

1995); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013 (1984); Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1164 (1988); see also Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional
Founding, 62 U. CMl. L. REV. 475, 478 (1995) (contending that Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats, in spite of "breaking with the established system of constitutional amendment," still won the mandate of the People).
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Article V.2 In 1991, Ackerman elaborated on this thesis in We
the People: Foundations,3 the first book in a projected threevolume series. In Foundations, Ackerman explained the historical and theoretical bases of a peculiar American phenomenon he
called dualism. 4 In Ackerman's parlance, dualism refers to the
special innovation of the American Constitution to allow two
kinds of lawmaking-ordinary and higher.5 Ordinary lawmaking
is the everyday activity of political life in Washington and states
throughout the country,6 while higher lawmaking is the outcome
of a rare occasion in which the American people have carefully
considered the need for constitutional change.7 Higher lawmaking is not confined to concerted efforts to comply with Article V;
in fact it has been achieved on three noteworthy occasions that
did not conform to the formal rules for constitutional or constitutional-like amendment-the Founding of the Republic, Reconstruction, and the New Deal.8
Ackerman expands his arguments about the process of higher
lawmaking in the recently published second volume of his projected three-volume series, We the People: Transformations.' In

Transformations,Ackerman explores "how American institutions
have in fact operated to organize popular debate and decision

2. Article V provides, in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by the
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the
Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent,
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
3. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at 6-7.
at 6, 234-35, 265.
at 6, 240, 272-74.
at 40.

9. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
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during our most creative periods of constitutional politics. The
aim is to learn what history can teach about the ways Americans have translated the heady rhetoric of constitutional politics
into enduring judgments of higher law."10 The "creative periods"
discussed in detail by Ackerman are Reconstruction and the
New Deal.1
The purpose of this Review Essay is not to rehash prior
commentaries' praise 12 or criticism i3 of Ackerman's work. Instead, its purpose is to assess the thesis of Ackerman's new book
on its own terms. Repeatedly throughout the book, Ackerman
claims to be establishing his provocative thesis in the manner of
a good common-law lawyer' 4 (or "common lawyer" in Ackerman's
words 5 ). According to Ackerman, such lawyers study "precedents" to identify the appropriate "rules" and "principles" to
govern legal decisionmaking in an area not governed by some
positive law.' 6 The sources on which Ackerman relies to construct a common law of higher lawmaking are diverse, including,

but not limited to, Supreme Court opinions; congressional debates, hearings, and speeches; newspaper editorials; presidential
memoranda, orders, and addresses; and other public docu-

ments.' 7 For Ackerman, the critical task is to synthesize or coor-

10. Id. at 6.
11. See id. at 99-252, 255-382.
12. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How
Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A)<26; (B)26;
(C)>26; (D) All of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 409, 429 (1991); James Gray
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 304 (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Flag-Burning Episode: An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 39, 48-53 (1990);
Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1515 (1990).
13. See, e.g., Michael J. Kiarman, Constitutional Fact/ConstitutionalFiction: A
Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv.
759 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918
(1992) (reviewing 1 ACKEI4.AN, supra note 3); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in Constitutional Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1995).
14. See 2 ACKEIAN, supra note 9, at 17, 30, 66, 92, 205, 232, 246, 252, 269,
270, 360, 367, 370, 371, 384.
15. See id. at 360.
16. See id. at 30.
17. See id. at 17.

1734

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1731

dinate these sources of constitutional meaning into a coherent
body of law governing higher lawmaking."8
This Review Essay examines whether these latter sources do
in fact support a common law of higher lawmaking. It demonstrates the methodological problems, including the inconsistencies and contradictions, in Ackerman's treatment of constitutional text, history, and judicial precedent. The Review Essay concludes that a principled or consistent approach to these sources
indicates that they do not support a common law of higher
lawmaking. 9 Instead, they demonstrate that constitutional
change-or higher lawmaking-is not something confined to the
three moments identified by Ackerman but rather is made in a
much wider and often subtler array of formal and informal practices and arrangements than Ackerman has recognized.
After reviewing the book's basic argumentation in Part I, Part
II analyzes Ackerman's methodology for construing the Constitution as not expressly precluding a common law for higher lawmaking. Central to Ackerman's interpretation of the text is the
assumption that it only bars exercises of governmental power,
including higher lawmaking, that are not explicitly prohibited by
the Constitution. This assumption is incompatible with the
structure of the Constitution, constitutional tradition, and a
consistent line of Supreme Court precedent." Moreover,
Ackerman's methodology in reading Article V as a nonexclusive
18. See id. at 30.
19. As Benjamin Cardozo explained, a judge engaged in common law adjudication
has to consult or analyze a variety of sources of decision, including constitutional
text and structure, history, custom or tradition, and past judicial opinions. See BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10, 28, 31, 60, 65-66, 71-

72, 164-65 (1921). In the field of constitutional law, the sources of authority-or
those sources on which a good constitutional law argument is based-primarily consist of the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, tradition and historical
practices subsequent to ratification, as well as judicial precedents. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS
AND PERSPECTIVES 348, 358-61 (1993) (contending that the technique one uses to interpret a particular constitutional provision will vary according to the provision). For
purposes of this Review Essay, I will confine myself to those things that Ackerman
suggests a common-law lawyer should consult in constitutional adjudication, namely,
the text of the Constitution, historical practices (including the public statements,
decisions, and actions of national political leaders), and judicial precedents. See 2
ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 17.
20. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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grant of higher lawmaking authority to the President or Congress conflicts with his very narrow reading of other constitutional provisions, such as the Republican Guarantee Clause, 21 as
severely constricting governmental power.22
Part III examines Ackerman's use and conception of history.
History is crucial to Ackerman's enterprise as the source of the
most important common-law precedents of higher lawmaking.
This treatment of history is problematic because it rests on an
erroneous conception of certain historical practices as constituting principles of law and rules that should and do bind courts as
well as federal and state lawmakers. Neither history nor constitutional law supports this conception.
Even if it were possible for history in some configurations to
serve as legally-binding precedent, Ackerman's historiography,
or the way in which he uses history to construct precedents, is
problematic in three respects. First, Ackerman fails to construct
and adhere to a principled or systematic approach to history.
This ad hoc approach leads Ackerman to gloss over or ignore the
implications of changes in the meanings of terms or institutions
that he tracks through time. It also leaves him unrestrained in
trying to fit his theory to the facts rather than the facts to his
theory.
The second major problem with Ackerman's historiography is
that he assumes but never proves that the American people
largely understood and were integrally involved in ratifying the
illegalities of the constitutional reforms associated with the
Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. Moreover, he does
not adhere faithfully to his stated understanding of popular
sovereignty in practice-intense interaction (and dialogue) between the people and their elected national leaders.2" Ackerman
repeatedly describes historical events in a manner that suggests
(without proof) a much greater degree of popular involvement
and understanding of critical developments than the historical
record would support.
21. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (providing that "The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . .
22. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
23. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 187.
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Third, Ackerman does not adhere faithfully to his preferred
methodology for clarifying the significance of historical events.
Ackerman suggests that to appreciate the ways in which institutions both have led and shaped popular opinion and support
during the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal one
should focus on the public actions and statements of national
leaders rather than the private or subjective motivations of
those leaders.24 He fails, however, to defer to the public declarations of the architects of Reconstruction and of Congress, the
Supreme Court, and even President Franklin Roosevelt during
the New Deal era, to the effect that the constitutional changes
associated with these constitutional moments followed constitutional norms for higher lawmaking. Instead, he avoids the
implications of these declarations by trying to explain why they
should not be taken at face value.
Part IV examines Ackerman's claim that certain judicial precedents support his thesis. First, it demonstrates that
Ackerman's argument that the Supreme Court participated in
the consolidation of Reconstruction as a constitutional moment
rests on an incomplete reading of some-and Ackerman's overlooking of several other-important Supreme Court decisions.
Second, Part IV shows that Ackerman distorts several important
judicial precedents to maintain that the Court's shift from inconsistently to consistently upholding the constitutional foundations
of the New Deal was the consequence of a new, revolutionary
interpretation of the Constitution.
Part V analyzes the implications of Ackerman's proposals for
maximizing popular sovereignty in effecting constitutional moments. The proposals include a supermajority requirement for
Supreme Court appointments and the adoption of a "Popular
Sovereignty Initiative" that would allow for the scheduling of
two popular votes on initiatives for constitutional change proposed by reelected presidents.2" At the end of his book,
Ackerman acknowledges that his suggested reforms for facilitating greater popular sovereignty in higher lawmaking would

24. See infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 269-76 and accompanying text.

ACHERMANIA

1999]

1737

likely fail. This admission is telling, for it reflects the obvious
degree to which the American people do not govern higher lawmaking. In the final analysis, Ackerman's great mistake is that
he has overstated the pull or force of popular sovereignty in
American democracy. Popular sovereignty does not explain the
Founding, Reconstruction, or the New Deal, nor most constitutional change in American history. Constitutional change is
largely a function of institutional activity that turns on the participation or key decisionmaking of certain political elites rather

than "We the People."
I. ACKERMAN'S TRANSFORMATIONS
Ackerman's first volume, Foundations, provides an important
backdrop for understanding the arguments of his second volume,
Transformations. In Foundations, Ackerman reinterpreted the
Founding period. In his view, the Founders were revolutionaries
who created a special constitutional order embodying two kinds
of olitics otherwise known as dualism: normal or ordinary politics and higher lawmaking or constitutional politics.27 Normal
politics is what goes on everyday in Washington, D.C." The
politicians who engage in this kind of politics are, for Ackerman,
substitutes for the people but truly cannot speak on behalf of
"We the People."2 9 During periods of normal politics, most Americans focus on their private concerns. By contrast, higher lawmaking has occurred only three times in our history-the
Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal."0 It is a process of
extended and thoughtful deliberation by a significant portion of
the people, in which private citizens temporarily become private
citizens.3 1 A higher lawmaking system allows an engaged citizenry to focus on the kinds of basic issues that would fundamentally change the constitutional order.

26.
27.
28.
29.

See
See
See
See

2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 415.
1 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
id.
id. at 6-7, 234-35.

30. See id. at 58.
31. See id. at 12-13, 261-62, 265.
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In Transformations, Ackerman focuses on the work of two
other groups of "revolutionary reformers" 2-- the Reconstruction
Republicans and the New Deal Democrats. In all three periods-the 1780s, the 1860s, and the 1930s-Ackerman sees a
similar pattern. The pattern consists of five phases of higher
lawmaking in which the institutions of the national government
both led and reflected public opinion: a signaling that major
constitutional change may occur,"3 the public shaping of proposals for change, 34 a triggering event (such as a landslide election), 5 the ratification of change,3" and a period of consolidation.37
The institutional actors seeking and proposing change during
Reconstruction and the New Deal were different from those
existing during the Founding, but the pattern of momentous
constitutional change was the same. In Reconstruction, the elections of 1860, 1864, and especially 1866 signaled the prospect of
an end to slavery."8 Proposals took the form of the Fourteenth
Amendment (and related legislation), 9 and the triggering phase
consisted of several events, including Congress's enactment of
the Reconstruction Act of 1867 and the initiation of impeachment proceedings against Andrew Johnson.40 President
Johnson's acceptance of congressional supremacy in fashioning
Reconstruction (leading to an acquittal in his impeachment trial)
furnished ratification, 4' and the election of Ulysses Grant in
1868 and the Supreme Court's endorsement of the Reconstruction Amendments consolidated the constitutional changes embodied in Reconstruction.
In the New Deal scenario, the election of 1932 signaled the
prospect of a more activist regulatory state.43 Proposals took the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See
See,
See,
See,
See,
See,
See
See
See
See
See
See

2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 279.
e.g., id. at 40-49.
e.g., id. at 49-53.
e.g., id. at 53-57.
e.g., id. at 57-64.
e.g., id. at 64-65.
id. at 126-30, 206.
id. at 173-78.
id. at 178-83, 187-91.
id. at 227-30.
id. at 237-47.
id. at 281-85.
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form of New Deal legislation," and the triggering event was the
election of 1936. 4 ' The Supreme Court's "switch in time" in 1937
furnished ratification, 46 and turnover on the Court brought, by
the 1940s,47 consolidation of the "constitution" embodied in the
New Deal.
In asserting his theory of dualism, Ackerman poses a direct
challenge to the conventional notion (what he calls the
"hypertextualist" position) that Article V provides the only mechanism for amending the Constitution. 8 Just as the Philadelphia
framers went beyond the methods spelled out for revising the
Articles of Confederation, Ackerman argues for the legitimacy of
the unconventional means used by Reconstruction Republicans
and New Deal Democrats for achieving fundamental constitutional changes.
Ackerman seeks both to describe what has happened at the
great constitutional moments in American history and to prescribe a legitimate means for changing the Constitution without
making recourse to Article V. Taking the Reconstruction era and
the New Deal as exemplars, Ackerman's thesis highlights the
value to be found in intense public debate and struggle over
proposals that would affect such fundamental arrangements as
the respective powers of the states and national government.4 9
The institutions of the national government provide the forum
for both the debate and the struggle. For example, rather than
discrediting the conventional view of the pre-1937 Supreme
Court as nine old men standing in the way of progress,
Ackerman pays homage to the struggle between that Court and
the other branches of the federal government-the President
who envisioned and the Congress that fashioned the New
Deal-because it forced Americans to recognize that the emerging New Deal challenged the existing constitutional commitments to free markets and a limited national government. 0

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

286-90.
306-11.
350-59.
359-77.
72.
187-88.
346, 349-50.
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In the final part of his book, Ackerman proposes two reforms
for facilitating popular sovereignty in effecting constitutional
moments. First, he proposes a supermajority requirement for
Supreme Court appointments.51 He acknowledges that this proposal would probably
deprive the President, and the nation, of the only method
[transformative Supreme Court appointments or the kinds of
appointments made by Franklin Roosevelt to transform the
Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking] that has yet
evolved to permit the expression of the nationalistic aspect of
modem constitutional identity. By putting an end to the
practice of transformative appointment, it would leave the
nation with the state-centered tools provided by Article

Five-tools that have repeatedly proved inadequate at the
great turning points of the past.52
Adopting a supermajority requirement for confirming Supreme Court appointments would, however, help to democratize
Supreme Court selections. The requirement would accomplish
this objective because it would allow Supreme Court appointments to be made only by very popular presidents who would be
willing to expend some of their popularity on behalf of their
judicial appointments or to mobilize popular support in favor of
their Supreme Court appointments.
Moreover, Ackerman maintains that requiring a supermajority
for Supreme Court appointments should be done only in conjunction with other reforms designed to enhance popular sovereignty."3 The most important of such proposals is Ackerman's
"Popular Sovereignty Initiative,"' which would provide that
[ulpon successful reelection, the President should be authorized to signal a constitutional moment and propose amendments in the name of the American people. When approved
by Congress, such proposals.., should be placed on the ballot at the next two presidential elections, and they should be

added to the Constitution if they gain popular approval. 55
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 407.
Id.
See id. at 412-14.
Id. at 414-17.
Id. at 410.

1999]

ACKERMANIA

1741

This proposal has the virtues of excluding the states (regarded
by Ackerman as barriers to rather than facilitators of popular
reform) from the amendment process and treating each voter as
"an equal citizen of the nation" with the opportunity to render
his or her opinion on the need for constitutional reform.5 6

II. ACKERMAN'S TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
To construct a common law of higher lawmaking, Ackerman
initially has to demonstrate that the Constitution does not preclude amendment in a manner that deviates from the formal
procedures for higher lawmaking set forth in Article V. To make
the argument that Article V does not establish an exclusive
means for amending the Constitution, Ackerman adopts a reading of Article V that, as I demonstrate below, conflicts with constitutional norms and undercuts his proposed methodology for
construing other relevant parts of the Constitution.
Ackerman's argument on this score begins with the assertion
that the Founders (and subsequent constitutional authorities
during Reconstruction and the New Deal) believed that "both
text and practice deserve weight in the evolving law of higher
lawmaking."5 7 The text is not exclusive because it "does not
claim exclusivity."58 For Ackerman, therefore, the text is not a
dispositive source of its own meaning. In the absence of a clear
textual directive, one must be prepared to look outside of the
text for clues as to its meaning and scope.
The problem with this approach to the constitutional text is
that it conflicts with the plain meaning of the text, constitutional tradition and structure, as well as Ackerman's methodology in
reading other parts of the Constitution. First and foremost, the
Constitution purports to create a number of distinct but interrelated institutions and practices and to define the rules governing
those institutions and practices. The Constitution does not specify any formal role for the people in higher or lower lawmaking.
Although this silence does not necessarily preclude the people

56. Id.
57. Id. at 72.
58. Id. at 73.
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from trying to effectuate constitutional change in any manner
they please, the people's power to amend the Constitution, if it
comes from anywhere, comes from this silence, not from the text
of the Constitution. At least since McCulloch v. Maryland,5 9
constitutional silence does not necessarily constitute a positive
grant of authority to any part of the federal government.60
Moreover, as Professor Laurence Tribe has shown, the process
of constitutional interpretation would be paralyzed if the simple
absence of the qualifier "only" meant that a clause was not "exclusive." 6 Article V is one of many constitutional provisions the
plain purpose of which is to define a process by which to exercise
a certain power-in Article V's case, that of making higher law.
These powers-granting provisions of the Constitution are crucial
for determining whom the Constitution authorizes to take legal
actions, and the particular significance of those actions in our
system of government. If these provisions do not constrain, preclude, or preempt alternatives for achieving precisely the same
ends, their constitutional significance disappears. The structure
of the Constitution loses much if not all of its meaning because
it becomes optional rather than binding on the institutions it
purports to define and govern.
Several Supreme Court decisions from the early nineteenth
century to the present confirm the importance of reading exclusively the powers-granting provisions of the Constitution. A
small sampling includes Marbury v. Madison,6 2 the Term Limits
case, 63 and, most recently, the Line-Item Veto Act decision. 64 In

59. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
60. See id. at 405 ("This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to
it, .. . is now universally admitted.").
61. See Tribe, supra note 13, at 1241-45, 1273-76.
62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or
exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.").
63. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806 (1995) ("[Ihe Qualifications Clauses were intended ...
to fix as exclusive the qualifications in the

Constitution.").
64. Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2103 (1998) ("There are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue
[the authorization of the President to veto only particular items in a bill] as equiva-
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his famous commentaries on American constitutional law, Justice Joseph Story agreed with the Court's position that "[t]here
can be no doubt, that an affirmative grant of powers... will
imply an exclusion of all others."6 5
Assuming arguendo that Ackerman's methodology in approaching this clause is sound, he does not follow it consistently.
For example, in discussing Reconstruction, Ackerman suggests
that the Republican Guarantee Clause does not authorize Congress to condition the states' reentry into the Union on their approval of the Reconstruction Amendments, because it does not
expressly grant such power to Congress.66 He also suggests that
Congress acted illegitimately in securing the ratifications of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments because it had no authority to count states (or those entities that qualified as states)
differently for securing the ratifications of different amendments." Neither Article V nor the Republican Guarantee Clause,
however, explicitly prohibits Congress from placing conditions on
states in order for them to reenter the Union subsequent to
secession or the Civil War. Nor does the Constitution in Article
V or the Republican Guarantee Clause explicitly bar Congress
from using different strategies in securing the ratifications of
different amendments. Furthermore, if the absence of any express prohibition in Article V could be read as allowing the people and the institutions of the national government to amend
the Constitution outside of the formal procedures set forth in
Article V, one could similarly construe the Republican Guarantee Clause, by virtue of its silence, as not expressly prohibiting
Congress from imposing conditions on the reentry of states into
the Union after the Civil War.6"
lent to an express prohibition.").
65. JOSEPH STORY, COMmENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
155 (1833).
66. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 106-10.

67. See id. at 101-09.
68. Ackerman's argument that Congress lacked the authority to place conditions
on the reentry of states into the Union or to use different strategies in securing the
ratification of different amendments is based in part on the absence of any such
express authority given to Congress in Article V. Article V, however, does not grant
any express authority to the people, the President, or Congress to deviate from it in
amending the Constitution.
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Moreover, Ackerman's argument that Congress had no authority to condition reentry of the southern states into the Union on
the acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment ignores the fact
that Congress had been placing conditions on statehood well
before the Civil War.69 In only one instance did the Supreme
Court strike down such conditions,7 and it did so not because of
some general principle that Congress lacked any authority to
place conditions on statehood but rather because the conditions
imposed in that case, in the Court's view, violated the Fifth
Amendment.71 Ackerman's construction of Article V seems to
depend on not just a self-serving mode of constitutional interpretation and weak historical support, but also his personal biases.
For Ackerman, it is not coincidental that Article V is state-centered, i.e., it is based on the idea that an important forum for
debate and action on constitutional amendments will be in the
states (either in the legislatures or conventions that the legislatures have authorized).
The latter circumstances are precisely what compel Ackerman
to seek reform of Article V. He explains that Article V is wrongheaded because it gives undue authority to the states in the
amendment process and that states cannot be trusted in the
higher lawmaking process, particularly if "We the People" want
federal authority expanded at the expense of the states.' One
need look no further for a response to this contention than
Ackerman's own arguments in support of reforming Article V.
For Ackerman, states cannot be trusted because state officials
invariably think only of what will benefit themselves or their

69. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West,
1801-1809, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1441, 1452-56, 1502 (1998) (describing the bases
for Congress's decision to place conditions on Ohio's statehood in 1802). Before the
Civil War, Congress also required certain conditions to be met in order for Kansas
and Missouri to be admitted into the Union. See 1 DEXTER PERKINS & GLYNDON G.
VAN DEUSEN, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A HISTORY 322, 611 (2d ed. 1968).
70. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449-52 (1856).
71. See id. at 425. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "nor
shall any person . . .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
72. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 407 ("[The state-centered tools provided by
Article Five . .. have repeatedly proved inadequate at the great turning points of
the past.").
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authority or the authority of the governments of which they are
a part.7" Ackerman does not provide any empirical support for
this assertion. Nor is it surprising for Ackerman to take this
position in light of his greater confidence in federal officials,
particularly the President, to deal appropriately with national
problems.74
If Ackerman's distrust of state officials has merit, though, it is
unclear why federal officials would be immune to the same problem. It is entirely conceivable that state and federal officials
would be prone to act to some degree on behalf of the respective
interests of the governmental entities they represent. If, however, self-interest plays a significant role in higher lawmaking, it
becomes much more difficult to identify the differences between
ordinary and higher lawmaking. Other scholars have demonstrated that the obscurity of this line undermines Ackerman's
conception of higher lawmaking.75 Part III examines more closely other problems with Ackerman's historiography of Reconstruction and the New Deal.

73. See id. at 415 (noting that "state politicians" are likely to "refuse" to agree to
give up any of their authority in the amendment process because they "are interested parties").
74. Ackerman contends:
If we hope to move beyond the present practice, we must come up with
an alternative that also expresses the modem American understanding
that We the People of the United States can express its constitutional
will in a process in which the President plays an important role. Rather
than ignoring Reconstruction or the New Deal, the challenge is to channel nationalistic, and Presidentially centered, understandings into a better
lawmaking structure.
Id. at 408.
Ackerman continues:
[M]y proposal [for reform] highlights the basic problem with the status
quo: the mismatch between modem constitutional identity and the classical forms of constitutional amendment. Modem Americans put their national identity at the center and expect the Presidency to take a leading
role in the process of articulating the nation's future. The classical system puts federalism at the center and assumes [wrongly] assembly leadership over the process.
Id. at 413.
75. See, e.g., Kiarman, supra note 13, at 780-85; Sherry, supra note 13, at 928
n.31.
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III. ACKERMAN'S CONCEPTION AND USE OF HISTORY
History is crucial to Ackerman's undertaking. It consists of
the practices that he regards as supplementing and thereby
illuminating the meaning of the Constitution's text. When done
in a pattern or manner that tracks one of the phases of higher
lawmaking, Ackerman regards such practices as constituting
precedents that have the binding force of law on present and
future generations.7 6 The existence of such precedents conflicts
with simplistic "hypertextualist" readings of the Constitution
that posit that the full meaning of the Constitution can and
should be discerned from "the four corners" of the document.7 7
This part examines the two major problems with Ackerman's
conception and use of history as legally-binding precedent. The
first is that neither history nor constitutional law supports the
notion or existence of history as a source of legally-binding precedent. The second is that, even if such precedents were possible, Ackerman misuses history in constructing them.
A. History as Precedent
Ackerman's conception of certain historical practices or patterns as constituting legally-binding precedents poses several
problems for his project. First, he errs in weaving all three constitutional moments (the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New
Deal) into a common law of higher lawmaking because only two
of the moments occurred when Article V was available as a
process for amending the Constitution. The Founding obviously
predated ratification of the Constitution and thus the adoption
of Article V, and, therefore, nothing about the Founding sheds
any significant light on the processes of higher lawmaking under
the Constitution. This leaves Ackerman with a maximum of only

76. The argument that historical practices may constitute legally-binding precedents is Ackerman's response to the often-made criticism directed at his theory of
constitutional moments that it fails to provide a compelling justification for present
and future generations to abide by past generations' constitutional commitments. See,
e.g., Klarman, supra note 13, at 765-66; Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Fidelity/Democratic Agency, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1538-42 (1997); Sherry, supra note
13, at 933.
77. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 72.
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two instances of higher lawmaking outside of Article V, and the
architects and proponents-of one of those, Reconstruction, claimed
to have been following Article V, 8 whereas the architects of the
New Deal maintained that their problem was not with the Constitution but rather the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution. 9 Moreover, the New Deal has neither been encapsulatea nor embodied in the same form of higher law as Reconstruction. Ackerman is thus left with only one precedent, the
New Deal, as an example of higher lawmaking in which, at least
according to Ackerman's account, higher law was made in a form
and manner that did not comply with Article V. One precedent
is a rather small set to constitute an entire common law of higher lawmaking. Indeed, a single precedent might not constitute a
common law at all. Nor is there common law in any other area
consisting of only a single precedent.
The second major problem with Ackerman's reliance on history as precedent is that neither of the two post-ratification constitutional moments he has identified (Reconstruction and the New
Deal) actually has served as a precedent for higher lawmaking.
Ackerman fails to offer a scintilla of evidence to indicate that the
architects of the New Deal had Reconstruction (or, for that matter, the Founding) as a model of higher lawmaking.
If a precedent has not been recognized as such by those who
have the most interest in claiming it as authority, its significance as precedent seems dubious. If those responsible for Reconstruction never considered the Founding as their guiding
precedent or those responsible for the New Deal never thought
of the Founding or Reconstruction as a precedent to guide their
higher lawmaking efforts, it is either post-hoc reasoning or wishful thinking to describe these events as "precedents" within the
field of higher lawmaking.
The third major problem with Ackerman's use of nonjudicial
precedents to formulate a common law of higher lawmaking is
that he ignores the richest body of precedents of higher lawmaking. Although by his own definitions Ackerman identifies one or,
78. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
79. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHNMG THE NEW DEAL COUR.
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 23 (1998).
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at most, two instances of higher lawmaking outside of the formal procedures of Article V, there are more than twenty-five
precedents of higher lawmaking that have complied with Article
V's formalities." If one truly were concerned with figuring out
the law of higher lawmaking, it would be a mistake to overlook
these other precedents because they comprise a more substantial
body of principles and rules of higher lawmaking for a good
lawyer to study than do Ackerman's one or two cases. It is odd
to talk of constructing a common law of higher lawmaking without taking into account the reasons for and the process by which
the overwhelming majority of higher lawmaking instances have
been made.
Once one studies these other instances, one discovers the
frequency with which higher law has been made-at least in the
form of amendments-without significant public input, support,
or interest. The public seems to have been widely interested (as
opposed to being directly involved) in higher lawmaking in several instances, including the ratifications of the Reconstruction
Amendments,"' the Seventeenth Amendment, 2 the Eighteenth
Amendment (legitimizing prohibition)," the Nineteenth Amendment (granting women suffrage)," the Twentieth Amendment
(regulating presidential succession), 5 and the Twenty-sixth

80. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-XXVII.
81. See Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory,
Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 914 (1996).

82. See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens'
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 538-47 (1997).
83. See EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 3-5
(1996).
84. Cf Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1519,
1520 (1997). Ackerman describes the Nineteenth Amendment as a "paradigm" in

which
a long campaign that mobilize[d] millions of women, and also men, finally gain[ed] a primary place on the national agenda and then [won] recognition in the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment. This new constitutional solution marked an important change, but the women's movement that spearheaded it was demobilized by its own success and did
not move on to challenge other inegalitarian features of the constitutional
regime.

Id.
85. See John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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Amendment (granting the right to vote to eighteen-year-olds), 6
The fact that there are several instances of relatively significant
public interest in higher lawmaking suggests that we have historically embraced Article V as the means of conducting constitutional change.
The remaining amendments have triggered modest or little
public interest because the public has not been their direct beneficiary. The most dramatic example of the latter kind of amendment is the Twenty-seventh Amendment,8 7 ratified in 1992.
Ackerman has trouble fitting this amendment into his analysis
because it became higher law in the exact opposite way in which
Ackerman has suggested such lawmaking should occur-without
any public support or awareness at all. When first proposed in
1792, the amendment did not receive the approval of the requisite three-fourths of state legislatures in existence at that time."
Congress set no deadline by which states had to vote on the
proposed amendment. States entering the Union after 1792 thus
had the opportunity-at least theoretically-to vote on the proposed amendment. None did until 1992.89 In 1992, as Ackerman
relates, the amendment's
partisans revived it... and ran a low-visibility campaign
amongst the state legislatures for its ratification, which ultimately resulted in approval by three-fourths. Since the
amendment purportedly restricts the power of Congress to
raise its own salaries, the present incumbents found it too
embarrassing to protest at this antiquarian revival and accepted its validity."0
Ackerman regards this amendment "as a bad joke," because it
violates

470, 478 (1997).
86. Cf Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE L.J. 581, 608 (1995) (compar-

ing popular support for Fourteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments).
87. The Twenty-seventh Amendment provides that "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an

election of Representatives shall have intervened." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
88. See 2 ACKERMiAN, supra note 9, at 490-91 n.1.
89. See id.
90. Id.
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the theory of popular sovereignty underlying Article Five
requir[ing] representatives of both the nation and the states
to think a proposed amendment is a good idea... this
[theory] is not satisfied if the assent of the nation is obtained
in the eighteenth century and the assent of the states in the
twentieth century. Instead, We the People must speak on
both national and state levels within a reasonable amount of
time of one another."
Ackerman's arguments against the Twenty-seventh Amendment are unavailing. To begin with, it is unclear why "the theory underlying Article V" should make any difference here. It
made no difference to Ackerman's analyses of Reconstruction
and the New Deal. More importantly, the fact that the Twentyseventh Amendment has received formal status as an amendment without any public or official opposition reflects greater
recognition among political elites of the superiority of the Twenty-seventh Amendment as enacted higher lawmaking as compared with the New Deal.92 In addition, such recognition demonstrates that Ackerman's historical precedents do not fully encapsulate the ways to amend the Constitution outside of Article V's
requirements, including many lacking significant public interest,
support, or participation.
Another serious problem with Ackerman's reliance on historical precedents, however, is that, as a matter of tradition in constitutional adjudication, they are not recognized as legally binding on political actors or judges. In Congress, for instance, the
rule is that present members of Congress do not have the authority to bind a subsequent Congress.9" Nor do courts recognize
historical events, practices, or patterns as legally binding. In
constitutional adjudication, courts defer to historical events only
if some justices have been persuaded that those events reflect

91. Id. at 491 n.1.
92. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V. The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993)
(discussing theoretical approaches to the amendment process).
93. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 49 (1996).
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some kind of authoritative tradition94 or illuminate the necessity
for overruling a precedent.9"
To put the point slightly differently, Americans have no tradition in the realm of historical or nonjudicial precedents analogous to the judicial doctrine of stare decisis. The closest thing
the nation has to such a doctrine outside of adjudication is tradition, but tradition hardly is the same as what Ackerman wants
to count as precedent. Ackerman attaches significance to certain
events precisely because they represent, in his opinion, deviations from the conventional or traditional mode of higher lawmaking.
Moreover, Ackerman does not seem to take very seriously the
binding quality of legal principles in the realm of higher lawmaking. As long as people have the means to change the Constitution as they see fit, there are no rules. Ackerman notes that
"[b]y breaking the law we will find higher law."96 If the rules for
making higher law do not constrain subsequent generations,
those subsequent generations are free as a practical matter to
change or abandon commitments as they see fit.
Yet another reason that Ackerman's conception of history as
precedent fails to work is that he neglects to investigate the

94. The degree to which tradition binds depends a great deal on the level of specificity with which it is identified. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("We refer to the most specific level at which a
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court should remain sensitive to the "balance struck by this country, having
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as
the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.").
95. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (plurality
opinion). In Casey, the Court explained that in reexamining a prior holding, it routinely asks, inter alia,
whether the rule [set forth in the prior decision] is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more
than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed,
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. 2 ACKERiM, supra note 9, at 14.
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possible relevance of war to the formation of the precedents he
has identified-the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New
Deal. One plausible link between these so-called precedents is
war, for armed conflict conceivably framed or closed discussion
of constitutional reform in each case. War might be a necessary
precondition for the kind of higher lawmaking that Ackerman
urges present and future generations to use as models. It is,
however, difficult to conceive how something as volatile as war
could be factored into the principles or rules of higher lawmaking. For his part, Ackerman's historiography completely fails to
address the extent to which the desire to maintain peace (and
domestic prosperity) after a war (e.g., the Revolutionary and
Civil Wars) or the desire to transcend domestic conflict in order
to wage another war on a grander scale (e.g., World War H1)
precipitated deviations from or inhibited recourse to conventional means of higher lawmaking.
B. The Problems with Ackerman's Use of History in
ConstructingPrecedents
Ackerman's use of history in constructing legally-binding precedents is problematic in three respects. First, he fails to adopt a
consistent or coherent approach to history. Second, he does not
adhere consistently to his methodology of deferring to the public
statements and actions of national leaders as reflective of institutional commitments. Third, Ackerman assumes but does not
establish that the American people played a significant role in
shaping or ratifying Reconstruction and the New Deal.
1. Ackerman's Failure to Adopt a Consistent Approach to
History
Instead of adopting a consistent approach to historical materials, Ackerman treats history as a kind of grab-bag from which
he picks and chooses the particular items that reinforce his
claims.97 This approach to history leads Ackerman to commit two

97. This mode of historiography has been referred to disparagingly as engaging in
"law-office history." Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122 & n.13.
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further errors in his historiography. The first is that he does not
address changes in the terms and institutions he is studying.
The second is that he tends to fit facts to his theory rather than
fit his theory to the facts.
a. The Relevance of the Evolution of Constitutional Terms
and Institutionsfor the Study of ConstitutionalMoments
The absence of a coherent theory of historiography in
Ackerman's book leaves Ackerman unrestrained in his use of
historical materials. For example, one of Ackerman's common
practices is to sift through presidential and congressional debates, presidential and mid-term elections, and newspaper articles and editorials from different historical periods to demonstrate that many national leaders used some similar language or
terms. The problem with this methodology is that ideas and concepts change over time. It is fundamental to sound intellectual
history to clarify the evolution of ideas over time, i.e., how the
meanings of terms change over time. Ackerman simply fails to
provide such clarification. A prime example of this failure is
Ackerman's treatment of the phrase "We the People." Ackerman
takes great pains to explain that his conception of "We the People" is "the name of [a special] process of interaction between
political elites and ordinary citizens."9 8 For Ackerman, this
phrase seems to have had the same meaning during the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal era, yet neither the
phrase "We the People" nor the fundamental concept Ackerman
regards as underlying or embodied within it-a special dialogue-has been constant over time.99
Similarly, Ackerman fails to explore the significance or implications of the evolution of the national political institutions
primarily involved in shaping the constitutional moments of
Reconstruction and the New Deal. He acknowledges that in the
New Deal era, Franklin Roosevelt achieved something as presi-

98. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 187.
99. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding,
and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 165-73 (1996) (examining
the evolution of the phrase "We the People" and the concept of popular sovereignty
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
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dent that Andrew Johnson did not, i.e., placing the presidency at
the helm of the national debate over the need for constitutional
amendment.'0 0 This, however, is an incomplete reading of historical events because it ignores the evolution of the presidency between the years of the Johnson administration and the 1930s.
For instance, the distinctive features of Johnson's presidency are
not confined, as Ackerman would seem to have it, to his obstinacy in refusing to accede to congressional leadership in the
formulation and implementation of Reconstruction.' ° ' One
should not lose sight of the fact that in its struggle with Johnson
for supremacy in fashioning domestic policy relating to Reconstruction, Congress was trying to force Johnson back into the
mode of all nineteenth-century presidents who, with the exceptions of Andrew Jackson and James K. Polk, regularly deferred
to congressional leadership in formulating domestic policy initiatives.'0 2 Even Abraham Lincoln tended to defer to Congress
when it came to domestic policy matters (as opposed to when
dealing with emergencies or war).' Viewed from this perspective, there was nothing momentous about Johnson's failure to
win this struggle; the extraordinary thing would have been for
Johnson to have won the contest for supremacy with Congress.
When one shifts attention from the 1860s to the 1930s, it is
readily apparent that the presidency itself transformed in the
interim. For instance, as Stephen Skowronek suggests in his
paradigm-shifting study of presidential powers, "Franklin Roosevelt, like Lincoln, made extraordinary changes in the [national]
government's basic commitments of interest and ideology, but he
did so by elaborating principles of governmental organization
that had been standard since the Progressive era."1°4 The movement toward greater regulation of the economy to promote social
justice and fairness had begun much earlier in the century, and

100. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 265-66.
101. See id. at 113-14, 169-80.
102. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725, 1816-19 (1996) (discussing the shift toward executive dominance).
103. See DAVID DONALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED: ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR ERA
187-208 (2d ed. 1969).
104. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM
JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 10 (1993).
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it had begun in the states. Building on the lessons derived from
state innovations, President Theodore Roosevelt took great
strides in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in
using the presidency as a "bully pulpit" to fix the United States's
place as a preeminent world power, particularly in the Western
hemisphere, and to advocate and defend national regulation of
large private corporations." 5 He also tried to appoint justices
who would be disposed to uphold progressive antitrust and securities laws passed by Congress.' 6 Subsequently, in the Bull
Moose era and particularly during Woodrow Wilson's presidency,
the movement toward increasingly expanding federal or national
regulation of economic and social issues became more common.'07
The next important step in support of a relatively active federal
government was made by Herbert Hoover, who, according to
Ackerman, "was anything but a stand-patter.... Hoover was a
social engineer who believed in the affirmative uses of government power. His response to the Great Crash of 1929 was quite
activist."' Hoover became "the first American president to meet
a downturn in the business cycle with massive governmental
interventions."0 9 Subsequently, as Garry Wills suggests, the
movement in favor of greater control of social policy and the
economy from Washington rather than from the states "became
a stampede. From [the beginning of the Roosevelt administration] on, an overlapping series of crises (Depression, world war,
cold war) led to central mobilization and control of resources.""
In other words, the New Deal represented a dramatic shift not
so much in the kind but rather the degree of national regulation
of the economy. The conception of what qualified as the national
economy for purposes of defining or clarifying the appropriate
realm of national regulation had shifted and expanded up to and
including Franklin Roosevelt's presidency, but this conception

105. See id. at 244-47.
106. Cf. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
SUPREIME COURT APPOINTMENTS 156-65 (3d ed. 1992).
107. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 104, at 258.
108. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 281.
109. SKOWRONEK, supra note 104, at 261.
110. Garry Wills, The War Between the States-and Washington, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 1998, at 26 (Magazine).
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did not begin nor, for that matter, end with Roosevelt's administration.
Of course, none of the changes in the scope of presidential
power or the size and responsibility of the national government
that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century happened
without significant congressional input and support. As the
presidency was changing (because of the interaction of a wide
variety of internal and external pressures), so too was Congress.
As members of Congress were responding to presidential assertions of power, they were experiencing (as well as trying to exert
their own influence over) various changes in their internal operations."' This dynamic is sure to have had a profound impact on
presidential-congressional interactions between the 1860s and
the 1930s. Perhaps most importantly, the mode of senatorial
election changed in the interim. The Constitution provided for
the indirect election of senators until the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for the popular or direct
election of senators, in 1917.112 Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, senators were much more beholden to the state legislatures that had elected them than to the public-at-large. State
legislatures made sure of the allegiance of the senators they had
chosen by issuing formal instructions on how senators should
vote on especially important matters and removing those senators who refused to follow such instructions."'
In his discussion of Reconstruction, Ackerman never explores
the relevance of the Founders' decision to provide for indirect
election of senators in the original Constitution or the practice of
instruction. In the nineteenth century, the Senate largely conducted its business as a whole rather than through committees,
whereas in the twentieth century much more of the Senate's
business is decided by smaller units or powerful individuals by
means of parliamentary or procedural manipulation." Political
111. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
(forthcoming, Duke University Press 2000) (discussing changes in internal congressional operations and congressional efforts to influence presidential operations).
112. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
113. See generally Bybee, supra note 82, at 517-30 (describing the means of controlling senators available to pre-Seventeenth Amendment state legislatures).
114. See generally BAR3ARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE
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parties exerted much more influence over Senate activity during
Reconstruction than they did during the era of the New Deal;
Senate staffs exercised much more authority during the New
Deal period than they did during Reconstruction. 1 1 5 The reasons
for and the fact of this evolution do not figure in Ackerman's
analysis, but both say a great deal about congressional-presidential dynamics in Reconstruction and the New Deal.
Nor, as I have suggested, does Ackerman address the positive
contributions made by another institution-the states-to constitutional change. 1 6 Each state comprises, in Justice Brandeis's
grand phrasing, a significant "laboratory" of democracy." 7 In
many critical moments of American history, the states have been
the great innovators in shaping economic and social policy. In
dealing with health, welfare, economic, gun-control, education,
and social policies, the states have proven to be much more
responsive to the popular mood or will than the national government."8 It is a mistake to think that the innovation that one
finds urged in critical periods of American history was first
crafted on Capitol Hill or in the White House. More often than
not, innovations have begun in the states. This was certainly
true on the eve of Franklin Roosevelt's election to the presidency
in 1932.
b. Ackerman's Defective Historiography
The second major consequence of Ackerman's failure to propose or adhere to a consistent approach to historiography is that
he is left unrestrained to fit historical facts to his theory rather
than fitting his theory to the historical records." 9 Five examples

155-73 (1989) (assessing the relative importance of committees and the Senate floor
as arenas for legislative activism).
115. See id.
116. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
117. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
118. See Wills, supra note 110, at 28-29.
119. Other scholars have exposed various shortcomings in Ackerman's accounts of
the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. See, e.g., Kiarman, supra note 13,
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illustrate this problem. First, in discussing the New Deal,
Ackerman neglects to mention a critical perspective of the Roosevelt administration. As Professor Barry Cushman has observed:
[President] Roosevelt and his advisers had contemplated
many alternative proposals when framing the [Court-packing
plan] and had rejected almost all of them. Thoughts of
amending the Constitution were abandoned early. In the first
place, it was Roosevelt's view that the Court, not the Constitution, was the problem. Amending the Constitution would
appear to be conceding that12the
Court's decisions against the
0
New Deal had been correct.

If neither Roosevelt nor his advisers conceived that they were
trying to amend the Constitution rather than using mechanisms
for correcting what they perceived to be a mistaken constitutional interpretation adopted by some Supreme Court justices,
Ackerman's account is not just incomplete; it is also misleading.
Second, Ackerman's reliance on Justice Robert Jackson's account of the New Deal as consistent with his understanding of it
as a constitutional moment is mistaken. Ackerman notes that
Justice Jackson took pride in the fact that his generation
stamped
"its own impression on the Court's constitutional doctrine. It
has done it by marshalling the force of public opinion against
the old Court through the court fight, by trying to influence
the choice of forward-looking personnel, and, most of all, by
persuasion of the Court itself. It must not be forgotten that
many of the most important changes in legal theory were
announced before there was any change in Justices.""'

at 769-71, 776-85; Sherry, supra note 13, at 924-25 (arguing that Ackerman's ac-

count of the Founding is flawed because "it ignores a tremendous amount of both
favorable and unfavorable evidence and thus can hardly be considered history at
all"); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565,
1568 (1997) (arguing that Ackerman's methodology is "hardl ...
to distinguish
Ufrom the approach claimed, if not practiced, by Antonin Scalia" and thus prone to
the same criticisms and problems as Justice Scalia's commitment to originalist interpretation of the Constitution has been).
120. CUSHMAN, supra note 79, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
121. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 347 (quoting ROBERT JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE
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Ackerman finds this quotation significant because of the sound
of the "note of satisfaction in Jackson's discovery that the Old
Court turned out to be pragmatic in the end." 2 The last two
lines of Justice Jackson's comments undercut, however, the notion that there was a revolution or some kind of concerted effort
to amend the Constitution that succeeded; Justice Jackson emphasizes that the most important factor in the period was "persuasion of the Court itself. It must not be forgotten that many of
the most important changes in legal theory were announced
before there was any change in Justices. "' This sounds much
more like the conventional account than Ackerman's rendition of
the New Deal. It also reinforces Professor Cushman's point that
the Roosevelt administration's problem was not with the Constitution but rather with the Court's interpretation of the Constitution.
Third, Ackerman regards the impeachment of Andrew Johnson as important to his conception of Reconstruction as a constitutional moment in two ways. He considers the threat of impeachment of Andrew Johnson as a triggering event in the constitutional moment of Reconstruction," and he treats Johnson's
signaling of his acquiescence to congressional leadership of Reconstruction to secure an acquittal in his impeachment trial as a
ratifying
event in the constitutional moment of Reconstruc1 25
tion.
Ackerman's treatment of Johnson's impeachment trial is distorted in two respects. First, as I have suggested, the struggle
between Johnson and Congress for supremacy in the higher
lawmaking of Reconstruction needs to be understood at least in
part as an effort on Congress's part to maintain the old constitutional order in which it, rather than the President, was supreme in domestic policymaking. 26 Second, a closer reading of
the historical record of Johnson's impeachment trial suggests

FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY at xiv (1941)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting JACKSON, supra note 121, at xiv).
124. See id. at 211.
125. See id. at 227-30.
126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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that Johnson's switch was not the determinative factor but rather one of many factors in his acquittal. Thirty of the fifty-four
senators who participated in the Johnson impeachment trial
filed written opinions in which they explained their views and
reasons for voting the way they did. 2 ' These statements indicate
that the outcome of the trial turned on several factors, including
genuine doubts, even among some who voted guilty, that impeachable acts had been charged or proved; 28 some uncertainty
that the Tenure in Office Act covered Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton (and hence Johnson's firing of Stanton did not violate
the act); 9 signals from Johnson that he would be easier to deal
with during the remainder of his term of office; 3 0 and the fear
harbored by many Republicans that Benjamin Wade, a radical
Republican, would become President if Johnson were ousted,
and would be even less31 receptive to congressional leadership
than Johnson had been.'

Another example of Ackerman's manipulation of the historical
record is his treatment of the election of 1874.132 In that mid-

127. See PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 863-1090 (F.
& Geo. A. Bailey eds., 1868).

& J. Rives

128. See, e.g., id. at 866 (opinion of Sen. Trumbull), 877 (opinion of Sen. Grimes),
888-92 (opinions of Sen. Johnson), 1071 (opinion of Sen. Henderson).
129. See, e.g., id. at 864-66 (opinion of Sen. Trumbull).
130. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENT
TRIALS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 247 (1993).
131. See id. at 243-46. In his book on the impeachment trials of Justice Samuel
Chase and President Johnson, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that another reason

for Johnson's acquittal may have been that the "tactics of the managers from beginning to end undoubtedly antagonized not only senators who were doubtful to begin
with but some who leaned toward conviction at the beginning." Id. at 247. He notes
another distinguished commentator's observation that the House Managers "'exhausted every device, appealed to every prejudice and passion, and rode roughshod, when
they could, over legal obstacles in their ruthless attempt to punish the President for
his opposition to their plans.'" Id. (quoting SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 721 (1965)).
132. Ackerman's misreading of the significance of the election of 1874 is similar to
his misreadings of other elections. He often reads the elections at or around the
periods of Reconstruction and the New Deal as providing affirmative mandates rather than repudiating certain political agendas. For instance, the 1866 congressional
election is more plausibly portrayed as a popular repudiation of President Johnson's
effort to readmit the southern states to the Union without requiring any significant
showing of repentance or restructuring of their political and social systems than as a
mandate for racial egalitarianism. See, e.g., MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE

1999]

ACKERMANIA

1761

term election, the Democrats won a landslide victory. As
Ackerman describes, "[f]or the first time since the Civil War, the
Democrats would control the House, and by a lopsided margin of
169-109."' 3 Ackerman suggests that the election was not part of
a constitutional moment to undo Reconstruction because, as he
emphasizes, the Republicans retained control of the Senate by a
margin of sixteen seats (45-29) and of the presidency."8 Moreover, he notes that the loss should be kept in perspective, because it was a mid-term election that occurred in the midst of a
period of ordinary lawmaking and such "elections almost always
result in victories for the party that is out of the White
House."" 5 Ackerman makes these arguments to counter Professor Michael McConnell's suggestion that there was a constitutional moment to undo Reconstruction, consisting of the concerted efforts to resist Reconstruction by Presidents Grant 1and
6
Hayes, Congress, the states, and segments of the population.
The fact that the election of 1874 might not be part of a constitutional moment actually undermines Ackerman's understanding of the significance of the 1874 mid-term elections.
Ackerman's suggestion that the mid-term election of 1874 occurred in the midst of a period of ordinary lawmaking is problematic because a year later Congress was back in the mode of
higher lawmaking when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875.3

OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 188209 (1974); ERIC L. McKTRIcK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 21-41, 442-

47 (1960). Ackerman's racial egalitarianism thesis, see 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at
178-83, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Republicans deliberately removed
black suffrage provisions from the Fourteenth Amendment because they feared a
political backlash in the 1866 northern congressional races. Indeed, northern state
referenda on black suffrage conducted during 1866 all yielded negative results. See,
e.g., 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 1261-65 (1971); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 24, 43 (1984); William W. Van

Aistyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of
the Thirtieth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 70.
133. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 472.

134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 115 (1994).
137. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-

1762

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1731

If Congress were engaged in higher lawmaking when it passed
civil rights statutes in the 1860s and early 1870s, 138 it makes no
sense to suggest that its passage of another similar statute-the
Civil Rights Act of 1875-was qualitatively different. The Civil
Rights Act of 1875 was passed not only in the wake of other Reconstruction civil rights statutes but also shared the same objectives of those statutes.
Moreover, the mid-term election of 1874 was quite unusual.
As the noted Reconstruction historian Eric Foner explains, "the
political landscape had transformed. As a result of the Democratic landslide, th[e 43rd session of Congress] would be the last
time for two years (indeed, as it turned out, for over a decade)
that Republicans controlled both the White House and Congress." 139 The rise in popularity and influence of the political
party that had opposed Reconstruction cannot be dismissed
lightly on the ground that the electorate was moving to other
issues and was no longer concerned with the fate of Reconstruction. In fact, the voters had not reached any final judgment (to
the extent that one can reliably read the outcome of the direct
elections of the House and the indirect elections of the Senate as
signs of some considered judgment of the voting public) on Reconstruction. Ackerman has superimposed on the Reconstruction
era (as he has on the New Deal era as well) an artificial framework that does not fit. Contrary to his assertions, Reconstruction
was a part of the daily lives, and plainly on the minds of, many
of those who voted in the 1874 election.
Ackerman's treatment of the 1876 presidential election as one
of the consolidating events of Reconstruction further illustrates
his selective reading of history. Ackerman bases his claim that
the 1876 presidential election consolidated Reconstruction partly
on the fact that both candidates, Republican Rutherford Hayes
and Democrat Samuel Tilden, accepted Reconstruction. 14 More-

1877, at 556 (1988) (describing the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as "represent[ing] an
unprecedented exercise of national authority, and breach[ing] traditional federalist
principles more fully than any previous Reconstruction legislation").
138. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 186-87, 205-09, 212-13, 230.
139. FONER, supra note 137, at 553.
140. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 248-49.
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over, he suggests that once Hayes became president he took
several critical steps to keep the Reconstruction "spirit" alive,"
including repeatedly. "veto[ing] the Democratic Congress's assault on the Republicans' statutory legacy in messages that
emphasized the constitutional issues.... Hayes's vetoes revitalized the Republican Party and gained broad popularity, and the
Democrats were obliged to accept defeat and pass appropriations
without the riders." 2 He claims further that rather than "backing away from the Republican commitment to the Reconstruction amendments, the Hayes Administration ended with their
ringing reaffirmation."'3 Ackerman also makes much of the fact
that Hayes's Republican party won the next presidential election
of 1880, reflecting, in Ackerman's estimation, further public
support for (or at least the absence of public opposition to) the
ideals of Reconstruction. 14
The first problem with this account is that in making it
Ackerman abandons his usual practice of attaching a great deal
of significance to popular votes. Tilden won the popular election
by almost 300,000 votes; 4 5 Ackerman tries to discount this fact
by noting that, in the midst of the campaign, Tilden published a
letter stressing that the debate over Reconstruction was over.'
Tilden's letter, however, could hardly erase the fact that he was
the standard-bearer of the Democratic party, which had defined
itself during the prior decade as the party that had opposed or
at least seriously questioned Reconstruction. It is hard to imagine that the Democratic party's identity as the opposition party
was largely lost on the voting public, many of whom had experienced first-hand the Civil War and its immediate aftermath
(including the Democratic party's involvement in all of the
events of that period).
The second problem with Ackerman's account of the 1876
presidential election is that he acknowledges, but does not

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. at 251.
Id. at 473 n.126.
Id.
See id. at 473-74 n.126.
See 1d. at 247.
See id. at 248-49.
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attach much significance to, the post-election compromise that
secured the presidency for Hayes. Ackerman correctly recounts
that Hayes won the presidency as a result of an eight to seven
vote by a special commission convened by Congress "to resolve
disputed returns from the three Republican states remaining in
the South." 147 The commission voted strictly along party lines.
Ackerman notes further that once he became president, Hayes
"stopped giving military support to the remaining Republican
governments of the South, leading to their rapid collapse."'
Ackerman's account is accurate to a point, but it does not go
far enough. There is more to the story: In accepting the presidential nomination of the Republican party, Hayes pledged publicly to bring the South "'the blessings of honest and capable
local selfgovernment,'' 49 a promise composed, in Eric Foner's
judgment, of "code words, [Hayes] well understood, for an end to
Reconstruction." 5 ° Nor was the message lost on Republican
leaders, many of whom strongly endorsed Hayes because they
expected that he would not support the continuation of Reconstruction. Moreover, once the election outcome was left for the
special Commission to resolve, Hayes engaged in a series of
behind-the-scenes negotiations designed to give, in Foner's
words, "discreet assurances that the next administration would
treat the South with 'kind consideration,' to detach enough
Southern Democratic congressmen from Tilden to insure Hayes's
election. But many Northern Republicans also hoped to use the
crisis to jettison a Reconstruction policy they believed had
failed."' 5 ' Hayes's decision two months after becoming president
to withdraw federal troops from the only remaining states in the
South with Republican-led governments-Louisiana and South
Carolina-sent a clear signal (that was understood widely
among the political elite of both parties) that the end of Recon52
struction was imminent.

147. Id. at 247.
148. Id. at 248.
149. FONER, supra note 137, at 567 (quoting presidential nominee Rutherford B.
Hayes).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 577.
152. See id. at 581-82.
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Ackerman cannot escape the significance of Hayes's decision
to withdraw federal troops from Louisiana and South Carolina,
nor the implications of his other steps to signal and ensure the
end of Reconstruction. To begin with, Hayes used his cabinet
appointments largely to identify his administration with the
Republican party's reform wing, whose agenda was to end Reconstruction." Second, Hayes's withdrawal of federal troops in
Louisiana and South Carolina ensured that political opponents
of Reconstruction would take control in each state's government." Third, Hayes did not hesitate to use federal troops to
end the Great Strike of 1877, a series of uprisings in communities around the country to protest working conditions in the
mining and railroad industries.15 5 The federal government constructed armories not to protect black citizens in the South, but
to ensure that federal troops would be on hand in subsequent
labor difficulties in the major Northern cities. 5 6 Thus, the upheaval marked a fundamental shift in the nation's political
agenda. Hayes's willingness to use federal troops in the latter
context, but not on behalf of the enforcement of Reconstruction,
sent an unambiguous signal of the administration's priorities,
which plainly included abandoning Reconstruction.
The way in which Reconstruction ended does not fit with
Ackerman's conception of the Hayes presidency as another consolidating event of Reconstruction. The significance of the Hayes
presidency is not that it was part of a constitutional moment to
embrace racial inequality. Instead, it helped, along with the last
two years of the Grant administration, to consolidate the end of
Reconstruction. In withdrawing federal troops and otherwise allowing the remaining Republican governments in the South to
collapse, Hayes did not act alone. The Democratic House of Rep1 57
resentatives backed all of his efforts to end Reconstruction.

153. See ARi HOOGENBOOM, THE PRESIDENCY OF RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 51-53, 56,
60, 134 (1988).
154. See id. at 56-58, 62-69, 225-26.

155. See i.

at 79-92.

156. See FONER, supra note 137, at 582-83.
157. See HOOGENBOOM, supra note 153, at 69, 225-26 (noting, inter alia, the
Democrats' refusal to appropriate the necessary funds to maintain the Reconstruction
military presence in the South).
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Moreover, Hayes was merely finishing the job of ending Reconstruction that his predecessor, Ulysses Grant, had begun. In his
second term, Grant "presided over a broad retreat from the policies of Reconstruction."' 5 8 The end of Reconstruction within a
decade of its enactment thus was done by means of the concerted actions of all the institutions that had helped to bring it into
159
being, including the President, Congress, the Supreme Court,
the Republican party, and the states. Moreover, many private
citizens had gotten into the act, particularly in the South, by
terrorizing or committing violent acts against the intended beneficiaries of Reconstruction amendments and legislation. 160 The
institutions and the people that helped to end Reconstruction
were not disconnected from the events that had led to the ratification of the Reconstruction amendments just a few years before. Instead, these were the very same institutions that had initiated Reconstruction. Moreover, many of the people who had
lived through the Civil War and the early years of Reconstruction voted in state-wide and national elections in the mid to late
1870s. It hardly makes sense to imagine that these people would
have been indifferent to the higher lawmaking that, at least
according to Ackerman, they had had an important role in effectuating just a few years before. As one magazine observed at the
time, the general approval of the concerted dismantlement of
Reconstruction by national political leaders, state governors, and
the press revealed "how completely the extravagant
expectations
161
[aroused by the Civil War] ha[d] died out."
158. FONER, supra note 137, at 528. As noted by Grant's preeminent biographer

William McFeely, Grant "could devise no sustained federal program of law enforcement" by the middle of his second term. WILLIAM S. McFEELY, GRAN. A BIOGRAPHY
425 (1981). Grant's most egregious failures included not providing for enough federal
prosecutors to prosecute violations of the new civil rights laws in the South, and not
providing enough troops to curb or contain widespread private violence against
blacks throughout the South, particularly in Louisiana and Mississippi. Cf
HOOGENBOOM, supra note 153, at 224 ("[Njorthern support for Radical Reconstruction
had eroded, while southern opposition to it had grown violent. When Hayes took
office, Radical Reconstruction in the South had virtually ended ...
159. See infra notes 185-267 and accompanying text.
160. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of
a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 417-19, 427-28,
438, 441-43 (1990).
161. The End of the Civil Rights Bill, NATION, Oct. 18, 1883, at 326.
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2. Ackerman's Failure to Adhere to his PreferredMethodology
of InstitutionalAnalysis
Ackerman tells his readers that in order to illuminate the
significance of the interaction between institutional leaders and
the American people during Reconstruction and the New Deal,
he will focus on a wide range of public statements and actions of
those leaders.162 Moreover, in discussing the Supreme Court's
apparent turnaround in 1937 to uphold the constitutionality of
not just some, but all New Deal legislation, Ackerman emphasizes that he is concerned with the justices' public statements and
63
decisions rather than their private intentions or motivations.
If applied consistently, however, this methodology would lead
one to conclude, contrary to Ackerman's findings, that the architects of Reconstruction and the New Deal respected constitutional norms of higher lawmaking. For example, congressional Republican leaders during Reconstruction repeatedly proclaimed fidelity to Article V."6 Indeed, congressional determination to
legitimate the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the face of arguments
that it was unconstitutional was the primary impetus for the
Fourteenth Amendment. 165 The fact that Congress felt the need
to legitimate its 1866 legislation by promulgating the Fourteenth Amendment reflects the extraordinary importance that
compliance with Article V had for Congress. Moreover, by fashioning progressive legislation during the New Deal era, congressional leaders gave the impression that they believed such legislation was constitutional under existing norms. The congressional record is replete with their arguments that the legislation
they had enacted was constitutional under current norms as
they understood them.'66 Moreover, the Supreme Court, both

162. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 17.
163. See id. at 343.
164. Ackerman himself quotes from many such declarations. See, e.g., id. at 105,
117-18, 156-59, 170, 175-76. See also FONER, supra note 137, at 251-61, 276-77 (not-

ing that the Republican leadership argued throughout Reconstruction that its actions
in trying to implement various reforms adhered to or were consistent with Article

V).
165. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1325-28 (1952).
166. Ackerman acknowledges many such statements. See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra
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during the New Deal era16 7 and ever since, has consistently
denied that there was anything revolutionary about the Court's
to uphold the constitutional foundations of the New
decisions
1 68
Deal.
Ackerman tries to avoid the implications of these public declarations in three ways. First, he argues that many of these statements should not be taken at face value because they lack coherence or credibility. 169 This is a weak point because the basic
messages or signals sent by many national leaders to the public
during Reconstruction and the New Deal plainly communicated
a desire to maintain fidelity to the adoption of progressive reforms within existing constitutional norms. The fact that
Ackerman parses the words or actions of many Reconstruction
and New Deal leaders to reveal internal inconsistencies or technical flaws is meaningless, unless he can show that the people
themselves deconstructed these statements, decisions, or actions
to unmask the real intentions or objectives underlying them.
Second, Ackerman puts a great deal of weight on how the
opponents of congressional Reconstruction and the dissenters on
the Supreme Court characterized the reform movements asso-

note 9, at 256, 279, 283, 297-98, 339.
167. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574-76 (1995); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-64 (1992).
169. See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 153-55 (demonstrating the inadequacies or technical problems with Secretary of State Seward's proclamation on behalf of
congressional Reconstruction); id. at 216 (noting that "[flrom a strictly legal point of
view, [President Johnson] held a winning hand"); id. at 233-34 (suggesting the significance of the differences between Seward's endorsements of the ratifications of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments); id. at 293 (noting New Deal lawyers' differences of opinion regarding the constitutionality of some New Deal legislation); id.
at 363 (observing that in one New Deal case, "[tihe Court speaks the language of
continuity while the holding bespeaks the fact of rupture. A similar disjunction is
visible in another crucial decision upholding the Social Security Act."); id. at 365-66
(critiquing Hughes's reasoning and language in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish); id.
at 368-73 (demonstrating that in a line of New Deal Cases the Court used traditional language to mask its revolutionary agenda); id. at 373 (noting the significance of
the dissents in cases upholding New Deal legislation); id. at 400-03 (critiquing the
Rehnquist Court's explanations of the Court's break with its past decisions on the
Commerce Clause).
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ciated with Reconstruction and the New Deal. 7 ° Ackerman is
concerned with demonstrating that real constitutional meaning
emerges from the dialectic of constitutional "dialogue."17 ' Every
political loser, however, is going to characterize the winner's
actions as exceeding the constitutional norm. This is an old
game. During Reconstruction, Congress responded to this criticism by invoking Article V and promulgating the Fourteenth
Amendment. 72 During the New Deal era, Congress and the
President responded to this criticism by operating within the
constitutional order, backing legislation and Supreme Court
appointments that reflected a particular vision or understanding
of the Commerce Clause.173 Moreover, Ackerman never explains
whether the disagreements between contending forces over the
meanings of certain events sharpened or obfuscated those meanings for the general public. He also fails to explain why the voices of prevailing forces should not be given greater weight in
assigning or determining constitutional meaning, precisely because they have prevailed or endured.
3. The People's Participationin Higher Lawmaking
Ackerman's major purpose in Transformations is to demonstrate how national political institutions interact with (or lead)
the people in achieving or effecting enduring constitutional
change. 74 He fails, however, to make the requisite showing for
three reasons. First, Ackerman never demonstrates how the
institutions of the national government-particularly the president and Congress-led, reflected, and incorporated public
170. See, e.g., id. at 151-53 (discussing the significance of President Johnson's critique of or response to congressional Reconstruction); id. at 177-78 (describing the
significance of President Johnson's "unprecedented message" in opposition to Secretary of State Seward's Proclamation); id. at 306-09 (recounting the Republican leadership and conventions' critique of the New Deal in 1936); id. at 320-40 (discussing
the congressional opposition to President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan); id. at 35658 (discussing the significance of Wendell Wilkie's 1940 presidential campaign); id. at
363 (describing how Justice McReynolds was not "foolfed]" by Chief Justice Hughes
opinion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel).
171. See id. at 187.
172. See id. at 174-77.
173. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 3-8.
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opinion. Although one would have expected this dimension of
historical analysis to figure prominently in Ackerman's work, it
appears nowhere. He does not examine the ways in which national institutions actually consulted or took public attitudes
into account in their constitutional decisionmaking during any of
the historical events he has claimed as constitutional moments,
including the formal and informal contacts between national
political leaders and their constituents or interest groups, or any
informal contacts between the leaders themselves.
Second, Ackerman assumes that in periods of higher lawmaking "most ordinary Americans are spending extraordinary
amounts of time and energy on the project of citizenship, paying
attention to the goings-on in Washington with much greater
concern than usual."'7 5 He never establishes, though, that there
was any unusually high degree of citizen awareness, much less
understanding and participation in the constitutional discourse
that was occurring in the nation's capitol during Reconstruction
or the New Deal.'76 He never discusses the circulation levels of
newspapers during these periods; the relative numbers of nonpartisan newspapers and magazines during each of these periods; how many people actually read the newspapers and magazines during Reconstruction and the New Deal, or listened to the
radio during the New Deal; the relative numbers of telegrams
and letters to the White House or members of Congress during
Reconstruction and the New Deal; and in what other ways the
people exhibited or expressed their interest in and contributions
to the constitutional developments of the times.

175. Id. at 187.
176. The only exception is when Ackerman notes that polls indicated that most
Americans did pay attention to the tussle between the President and Congress over
his Court-packing plan. See id. at 333. Ackerman does not talk, however, about the
level of attention paid by the public to this debate. He even acknowledges that the
very same polls indicated a division of opinion on the President's plan. See id. At
least at this juncture of the supposed constitutional moment of the New Deal, the
public apparently was not firmly on Roosevelt's side, though the significance of this
ambivalence is far from clear. It is conceivable that people did not understand the
debate, or that some significant portion of the public thought it was inappropriate or
unnecessary to tinker with the Court's size, or that other methods such as future
appointments were more appropriate for vindicating the President's displeasure with
the Court, or even that the system was not broken, i.e., the Court was performing
satisfactorily.
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Third, Ackerman shows disdain for the ordinary citizen side of
the political equation. He derides "the last generation's fascination with social history. Rather than focusing on the rarefied
heights of Capitol Hill, recent historians have preferred to explore the meaning of Reconstruction history for the ordinary
men and women of the South."17 This is an extraordinary statement from someone who claims to be trying to vindicate popular
sovereignty in higher lawmaking. No one is better qualified nor
positioned than social historians to tell us precisely what "ordinary citizens" believed or how "ordinary citizens" expressed
themselves (including what they read, thought, and said) about
the constitutional issues of the day during Reconstruction or the
New Deal. Ackerman claims that the people are much more
interested in politics at moments of higher lawmaking; he makes
various assertions about what people must have thought or believed." 8 He even asserts that
the mark of [periods] of constitutional solution is a rare convergence in the language and concerns of leaders in the capital and ordinary citizens in the streets. Ordinary Americans
are no longer looking upon their leaders with their usual
skepticism. The constitutional rhetoric in Washington resonates in billions of conversations on the job, around the
breakfast table, and countless social settings.179

177. Id. at 118-19.
178. See, e.g., id. at 131 (suggesting that "[flor most Americans, the [Emancipation]
proclamation is a symbol comparable to the Constitution itself as a landmark of
American liberty"); id. at 133 (quoting but not elaborating on Harold Hyman's observation that "[w]hat was different in 1864 was the intense interest of ordinary voters
in issues and principles, men and measures, causes and aspirations'"); id. at 162 ("I
will argue that it was the People themselves who took this decision [about adding
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution] away from competing political elites
in Washington and decided it on their own responsibility. It is this decision of a
mobilized People, and not any textual formalism, that lies at the foundation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."); id. at 361 (discussing the Court's decisions immediately
after the "switch in time," Ackerman suggests "the general public was most interested in the Court's holdings"); id. at 377 ("Americans of the 1930s knew what they
were doing-and were not shy about saying that they were rebuilding, and not
merely rediscovering, the foundations of popular sovereignty in America.").
179. Id. at 409.
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Ackerman, however, never offers any concrete--or, for that matter, anecdotal--evidence to demonstrate the shift in public attention, discourse, and behavior. Moreover, the scholars who can
confirm or dispute these claims about the public's attitudes and
conduct-particularly the degree to which "ordinary citizens"
understood, discussed amongst themselves or their leaders, and
agreed with particular reforms or strategies being pursued by
national leaders-are social historians, whose work Ackerman
dismisses.
Instead, Ackerman argues that national political institutions
were trying to vindicate popular sovereignty by making appeals
for public support, and by claiming that the public supported
their endeavors to make higher law.8 ° Such appeals, however,
prove nothing; they are commonplace in politics, regardless of
whether ordinary or higher lawmaking is at stake. Such appeals
do not substitute for actual data (based, for instance, on polling
or referenda) reflecting the caliber and extent of the public's
understanding and evaluation of the constitutional choices
placed in front of it.
Nor does Ackerman fully explore the obstacles to public participation in the constitutional decisionmaking undertaken during Reconstruction and the New Deal, much less how national
political leaders tried to break down these barriers to facilitate
interaction or communication with the public on the great issues
of the day. These impediments included, particularly during
Reconstruction, the absences of modern polling techniques; the
absence of technology that would have allowed for swift reporting of breaking news events to the American people on a widescale basis, such as through radio or cable television;. 8 ' and the
proliferation of media outlets that served (particularly during
Reconstruction) primarily as partisan mouthpieces. 82 Moreover,

180. See id. at 10-11, 20-21.
181. Obviously, radio was available as a means of communication between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American people, and the President used this
technology to his fullest advantage. We do not know from Ackerman's book, though,
how many people owned radios or televisions, much less what media people used to
follow the events discussed in his book, such as the congressional hearings on the
Court-packing plan.
182. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 137, at 350 (noting presence of Republican news-
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the indirect election of senators undercuts his argument that the
mid-term election of 1866 gave a "popular mandate" to congressional Republicans to seek constitutional transformation in the
configuration of the Fourteenth Amendment."a Indeed, the indirect election of senators suggests the likelihood that most Americans would not pay close attention to debates in Congress, or at
least in the Senate, because senators were not directly accountable to the people. Ackerman's argument that, prior to 1917, a
close connection existed between the thinking of representatives
in Washington and the people throughout the country is based
on an unsupported assumption, rather than empirical proof.
IV. ACKERMAN'S INTERPRETATIONS

Ackerman argues that a critical function performed in the
past by the Supreme Court has been the rendering of
"transformative opinions-texts that gave affirmative doctrinal
meaning to the constitutional revolution under way" in constitutional moments."8 The problem is that in trying to establish or
illustrate the significance or nature of "transformative opinions,"
Ackerman distorts some and overlooks other seminal Supreme
Court opinions relating to Reconstruction and the New Deal.
A. Reconstruction
The first example of Ackerman's flawed reading of an important Supreme Court decision from the Reconstruction period is
his discussion of the Slaughter-House Cases.'85 According to
Ackerman, the Court's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases
represents "the last great step in the[] consolidation [of the Reconstruction amendments]."'86 According to Ackerman, two key
passages of the opinion confirm this reading. The first is the
statement by Justice Samuel Miller in his majority opinion that
"'within the last eight years three other articles of amendment of
vast importance have been added [to the Constitution] by the
papers as "essential to party organization").

183.
184.
185.
186.

See 2 ACKERIAN, supra note 9, at 188.
Id. at 368.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
2 ACKERIAN, supra note 9, at 245.
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voice of the people.""'8 The second critical passage is Justice
Miller's acceptance of the legitimacy of the Reconstruction
amendments without question: "'Statesmen'" who realized the
need for the Fourteenth Amendment "'passed through Congress
the proposition for the fourteenth amendment, and they declined
to treat as restored to their full participation in the government
of the Union the States which had been in insurrection, until
they ratified that article by a formal vote of their legislative
bodies.'"' 88 Ackerman suggests that when these two passages are
read together with the dissent's own unquestioning acceptance
of the Reconstruction amendments, it is clear that "[tihe Justices
speak with a unanimous voice.... [Aill nine unconditionally
accept the[] validity [of the Reconstruction amendments]. " '9
Ackerman argues that by accepting the new amendments without referring at all to any of the improprieties associated with
their ratifications, the Supreme Court had "finesse[d] the question of validity [of the new amendments and, in so doing,] acted
consistently with common law norms in ignoring the deep questions that everybody knew lurked just below the surface." 90
This reading is flawed for two major reasons. First, it rests on
the mistaken assumption that the Court could have-and perhaps should have-questioned the legitimacy of the Reconstruction Amendments. Ackerman himself notes that none of the
parties to the case challenged the legitimacy of these amendments. 9 ' Hence, it would have been difficult (if not practically
impossible) for the Court to have questioned the legitimacy of
the constitutional amendments both parties were asking it to
construe, even if it had wanted to do so. Questioning such legitimacy would have been-and would still be-unprecedented. The
Court generally tries to confine its decisionmaking in a constitutional case to the precise question in front of it. 9 2 Hence, by

187. Id. (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67).
188. Id. at 245-46 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70-71).
189. Id. at 245.
190. Id. at 246.
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURiSDICTION 48 (2d ed. 1994) (noting
that "the judicial role is limited to deciding actual disputes"); see also 2 ACKERMAN,
supra note 9, at 246 (stating that "[u]nlike constitutional courts in Europe, the Supreme Court gives no advisory opinions").
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accepting the legitimacy of the Reconstruction Amendments and
by not raising any legal issues regarding their ratification on its
own, the Court was following a conventional rather than a revolutionary practice.
The second problem with Ackerma's reading of the Slaughter-House Cases is that he neglects to acknowledge, much less to
assess the significance of, the Court's ruling in the case. In an
opinion with lasting consequences for constitutional law, the
majority effectively nullified the Privileges or Immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 The Slaughter-House Cases
decision was the first in a series of opinions obstructing federal
efforts to protect newly freed slaves and their families.'94 According to the majority, the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not
provide general federal protection for citizens, but rather protected only a few rights, "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its
laws." 95 Moreover, in addressing the petitioner's equal protection argument, the majority "doubt[ed] very much whether any
action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against
the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be
held to come within the purview of this provision."' 96
Besides not discussing the real significance of the SlaughterHouse Cases, Ackerman fails to discuss several other important
judicial precedents from the Reconstruction era. These precedents cannot be ignored in any attempt to analyze the dynamics
of higher lawmaking during the Reconstruction era, for they
demonstrate that the consolidation of which Ackerman speaks is
largely illusory.
97
The first sign of trouble came in United States v. Reese,'
which involved a federal criminal prosecution against two Kentucky municipal elections inspectors who had been charged with
193. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
194. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 82 (1872) (stating that
the Court did not see in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments "any purpose
to destroy the main features of the general system").
195. Id. at 79-80.
196. Id. at 81.
197. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
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violating two of the voting rights sections of the 1870 Enforcement Act for refusing to permit a black man to vote. 198 The relevant sections of the act were not expressly limited to state action
that was racially motivated; therefore the Court struck them
down as exceeding Congress's power under the Fifteenth
Amendment and ruled that any prosecutions under them were,
as a consequence, illegitimate. 99
Even more devastating to the promise of Reconstruction than
the Slaughter-House Cases or Reese was the Court's 1875 decision in United States v. Cruikshank.2 ° The case arose from the
Colfax Massacre, "the bloodiest single act of carnage in all of
Reconstruction."2 ° ' Indictments were brought under the Enforcement Act of 1870, alleging a conspiracy to deprive the victims of
their civil rights. °2 On the grounds that the wording of the indictments failed to specify race as the rioters' motivation, the
Supreme Court overturned the only three convictions that the
federal government had managed to obtain.0 3 More was at stake
than faulty language, however, for the Court argued further that
the Reconstruction Amendments only empowered the federal
government to prohibit violations of black civil rights by the
states; the responsibility for punishing crimes by individuals
rested where it always had-with local and state authorities.2 °
The decision did uphold the federal government's authority to
protect the "attribute[s] of national citizenship,"2°5 but these had
been defined so narrowly in the Slaughter-House Cases as to
render them all but meaningless to blacks. °6 In the name of
federalism, the decision rendered national prosecution of crimes
committed against blacks virtually impossible, and gave a green

198. See id. at 215.
199. See id. at 218-21; see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318, 321-23 (1879)
(holding that a "mixed jury in a particular case is not essential to the equal protection of the laws").
200. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
201. FONER, supra note 137, at 530.
202. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548-49.
203. See id. at 556-59.
204. See id. at 552, 554-55.
205. Id. at 555.
206. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 (16 Wall.) 36, 92 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
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light to acts of terror where local officials either could not or
would not enforce the law.
In United States v. Harris,°7 the Court reached a similar
result with respect to the criminal conspiracy sections of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871. The Court held that, because the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach purely private conduct, Congress lacked the power to punish members of a lynch mob who
had seized prisoners held by a state deputy sheriff."'
The most damaging judicial attack on Reconstruction legisla0 9 in which the
tion came, however, in the Civil Rights Cases,"
Court invalidated the public accommodations sections of the
1875 Civil Rights Act. In an opinion by Justice Bradley, who had
cast the pivotal vote making Hayes president, 210 the Court denied that either the Thirteenth or the Fourteenth Amendment
conferred upon Congress the power to prohibit private discrimination in public accommodations.211 The Court held that the
"first section of the Fourteenth Amendment... [is] prohibitory
in its character, and prohibitory upon the States. [It] is State
action of a particular character that is prohibited.... Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
amendment.2 1 2
This latter reading of the Fourteenth Amendment grew out of
the same view of the states as the primary protector of individual rights that the Court previously had expressed in the Slaughter-House Cases.13 The Court in the Civil Rights Cases found the
statute constitutionally defective partly because it "applies
equally to cases arising in States which have the justest laws
respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities
are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those which arise in
States that may have violated the prohibition of the amendment."21 4 In the Court's view,

207. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See id. at 638-44.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See 2 ACKERIAN, supra note 9, at 247-48.
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
Id. at 10-11.
See supra text accompanying note 206.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14.
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[a]n individual cannot deprive a man of his [rights] ...; he
may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of the
right in a particular case... ; but, unless protected in these
wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority,
he cannot destroy or injure the right... ; he will only render
himself amenable to satisfaction or punishment.2 15
It followed that, "in all those cases where the Constitution seeks
to protect the rights of the citizen against discriminative and unjust laws of the State[,] it is not individual offences, but abrogation and denial of rights, which it denounces, and for which it
clothes the Congress with the power to provide a remedy."2 16
The Court also refused to find that Congress had the authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to pass legislation punishing certain kinds of private conduct.2 1 In the Court's view, the
crucial question was whether the discriminatory refusal to serve
a black person in a public accommodation was similar to the
kinds of "badges" or "incidents" of slavery that the Thirteenth
Amendment was designed to abolish.21 8 The Court answered the
question in the negative. It stated that a refusal of service
has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and
that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is
to be sought under the laws of the State; or if those laws are
adverse to his rights and do not protect him, his remedy will
be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has
adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of State
laws, or State action, prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.219

It is possible that Ackerman will discuss the significance of
the Court's dismantlement of Reconstruction legislation in the
final volume of his project, Interpretations. In the meantime,
Ackerman leaves his readers with the misimpression that it is
possible to separate the consolidation of Reconstruction from its

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
See id. at 20.
See id.
Id. at 24.
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nullification or narrowing by the Supreme Court. As Ackerman
notes, the Court "will characteristically serve as the conservative
branch, leading a principled challenge to a rising movement of
revolutionary reform."2 2 ' While this concession helps to set the
stage for Ackerman's reform proposals, 221 it also accepts that
there is nothing democratic about a sequence of events in which
the Supreme Court not only failed to take the lead in a constitutional revolution but was also an active participant in closing it
down.
B. The New Deal
Ackerman's theory of transformative opinions as judicial action that helps to consolidate a constitutional revolution is central to his argument that the New Deal was a constitutional
moment. In his view, such opinions unfold in two stages. The
first is through the Court's dicta, which
may give the naive reader an impression of substantial doctrinal continuity. The only trouble is that a yawning gap has
opened between these quasi-traditional dicta and the course
of concrete decisions-making it clear to a common lawyer
that some new propositions of law, unexpressed in the opinions, are doing much of the real work.222
Ackerman explains further that "[tihis disequilibrium between
revolutionary holdings and traditional dicta creates cultural
pressure for a second stage of opinion-writing-in which a transformed Court elaborates new canonical doctrines that make
sense of its earlier revolutionary holdings."2 2
In trying to demonstrate the first phase of the transformative
character of the New Deal Court's opinions, Ackerman engages
in a very close reading of the Court's 1936 and 1937 decisions.
This reading leads Ackerman to conclude that
[w]hereas Roberts and Hughes often voted with the conservatives in 1936, they suddenly and systematically voted with

220. 2 ACKERIAN, supra note 9, at 291.
221. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
222. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 360.

223. Id.
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the liberals all the time in 1937-not only in 'leading' cases,
but in all cases where federal power was challenged. Given
the common law's sensitivity to a systematic pattern of holdings, lawyers had no trouble detecting the deeper theme:
Despite the Court's quasi-traditionalist dicta, the partisans of
the traditional Constitution were always on the losing side.2"4
In other words, Hughes's and Roberts's switch, beginning in but
extending beyond West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,2 5 signaled
that some kind of sea-change in constitutional jurisprudence was
afoot.
Ackerman's account of the first phase of the New Deal Court's
transformative opinions is problematic for two reasons. First, it
is fair to say that most Americans (who are not lawyers) would
fall into the category of "naive readers," 226 who, Ackerman has
suggested, would not detect an impending sea-change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence on the basis of the Court's superficial analysis. Instead, they would likely accept at face value the
Court's adherence to traditional language in economic due process cases as signaling the absence rather than the presence of a
ratifying or consolidating event of revolutionary proportions.
The second problem with Ackerman's discussion of the first
phase of the New Deal Court's transformative opinions is that
he fails to come fully to terms with the fact that the Court had
not uniformly ruled against progressive economic regulations
prior to 1937. Nor had the Court been unanimous in its adherence to economic due process prior to 1937. Ackerman neglects,
for example, to mention that a significant illustration of the
nonlinear movement to disassemble the legacy of the great case
symbolizing judicial activism on behalf of economic due process-Lochner v. New York 22 7-is the recognition in recent scholarship that Lochner verged on being an anomaly in its own
era.2 28 Indeed, the Court effectively overruled Lochner in 1917.229

224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 367-68 (emphasis added).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 360.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
228. See JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 115-16, 167-68 (1978); Melvin I.
Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Pro-
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Moreover, Lochner itself began on shaky ground, decided fiveto-four, with two powerful dissents filed, one by Justice Harlan
in which Justices White and Day joined,23° and the other by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes."' These dissents were just the
first salvoes in a movement of opposition to Lochnerian thinking.
Moreover, the Four Horsemen-Pierce Butler (appointed by
Warren Harding), James McReynolds (appointed by Woodrow
Wilson), George Sutherland (appointed by Warren Harding), and
Willis Van Devanter (appointed by William Howard Taft)-had
all cast several votes prior to 1937 in favor of New Deal initiatives. 2 Likewise, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts, the
swing justices, "had hardly been consistent foes of activist government prior to the plan's announcement."233 In addition, President Hoover's appointment of Benjamin Cardozo placed on the
Court a man whose opposition to Lochnerian thinking was wellknown at the time of his brief confirmation hearings in 1932.2"
Cardozo was among the justices whose opinions prior to 1937
helped to create, in Edward Purcell's words, "a doctrinal passageway" through which Hughes and particularly Roberts were
able to go en route to overturning Lochnerism for good.23 5 The
existence of legal doctrine prior to 1937 that countered

gressive Era, 1983 SUP. CT. HIST. SOCY Y.B. 53, 55, 62, 69. The classic statement of
this view is Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 295 (1913) (collecting decisions and concluding that
the "National Supreme Court, so far from being reactionary, has been steady and
consistent in upholding all State legislation of a progressive type").
229. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917) (accepting the judgment of
the state legislature and state supreme court in upholding a ten-hour work day law
as "necessary or useful 'for the preservation of health of employ~s').
230. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
232. The old-age provisions of the Social Security Act, the Wagner Act, and the
Tennessee Valley Act are among these initiatives. For an inventory of cases in which
some or all of the Four Horsemen signed onto New Deal initiatives, see Barry
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 246-48 n.255 (1994);
Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 25253 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAI E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN
(1995)).
233. Klarman, supra note 13, at 774-75 n.98.
234. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 461-63, 467 (1998).
235. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 VA. L. REV.
277, 280 (1994).
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Lochnerian thinking provided a legitimate basis on which
Hughes and Roberts could rely in making the turn they made in
1937.
Ackerman's account of the second phase of the Court's
transformative opinions during the New Deal era is no more
convincing than his account of the first phase. For Ackerman,
three cases symbolize the Court's dismantlement of the old constitutional order: United States v. Carolene Products Co.,236 Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 23 7 and United States v. Darby.2 38 A
fourth case, Coleman v. Miller,231 is important to Ackerman

because he believes it explicitly endorsed the New Deal revolution. '0
Generally, Ackerman's reading of these four cases is problematic because he assumes but never shows that the American

people in the late 1930s and early 1940s appreciated the significance of the innovative or revolutionary dimension Ackerman
has identified in the cases. There is no evidence, or at least
Ackerman produces none, to show that the American people
scrutinized the Court's opinions as closely as Ackerman has
done, or with sufficient scrutiny to expose their revolutionary
nature. It is safe to assume that most Americans did not read
the cases. It is also fair to assume that because the decisions
came down on the eve of the Second World War, many, if not
most, citizens were directing their attention elsewhere.
Much of the revolutionary quality of the Court's decisions
recognized by Ackerman is only perceivable by hindsight. This is
especially true with respect to the fourth footnote in Carolene
Products,24 ' which, in Ackerman's judgment, "began to fill the
gap left by the disintegration of traditional principles. [It] offered up a theory of New Deal democracy as an organizing
framework."2 42 Ackerman recognizes that "[it would take years
for the emerging majority to wrestle with [the] affirmative impli236. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
237. 304 U.s. 64 (1938).
238. 312 U.s. 100 (1941).
239.
240.
241.
242.

307 U.S. 433 (1939).
See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 117, 261-66.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 369.
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cations [of the footnote] in full-blown opinions of the Court."243
Even if this were true, it undercuts Ackerman's point that the
second phase of the revolution gained legitimacy because it further vindicated the will of a particular generation of the American people.' It is unlikely that the public was aware of the
footnote, much less supportive of the future directions in which
the Court would likely take the footnote.
Ackerman also overstates the significance of the Carolene
Products Court's adoption of a presumption that the state economic legislation rested upon a "rational basis."2 45 Ackerman
regards this portion of the opinion as revolutionary because
subsequent to the opinion "the Court has never again struck
down a regulatory statute as arbitrary. Carolene's 'rational basis'
test has become a fixed star in the modern constitutional universe-no less important than formulae like 'equal protection'
that derive directly from the constitutional text."24 Ackerman
neglects to acknowledge, however, that the Court used a rational
basis test in economic due process cases prior to Carolene Products, most notably in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrishin 1937247
and Nebbia v. New York in 1934.' Hence, Carolene Products's
use of a rational basis test was not novel; it followed from and
even paralleled the language from prior decisions.
The Court's decision in Erie arguably fits more neatly into
Ackerman's theory. By holding that there was no federal common law and rejecting the Court's past practice of using state
common law to define constitutional baselines (i.e., the property
or contract interests that would receive constitutional protection), the Court
sought to create a new foundation for economic freedom
through democratic politics and legislative reform. From this
perspective, the great sin of the Lochnerian era was the
Court's effort to constitutionalize the categories of the com-

243. See id.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See id. at 360-62, 367-75.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153.
2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 369.
See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).

248. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 538 (1934).
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mon law-striking down legislative reforms in the name of
their own
judge-made definitions of property, contract, and
24 9
torts.
In short, the Court "destroy[ed] the foundations of Lochnerian
jurisprudence by demystifying the common law."250
There are two major problems with Ackerman's reading of
Erie. The first is that the Court was unanimous, including a
concurrence by Justice Butler in which the most ardent of the
Four Horsemen-Justice McReynolds-joined. 5 ' Justice Butler
concurred on the ground that the case could be resolved without
having to decide any constitutional questions.2 52 Nevertheless,
the lack of a dissent from Justice McReynolds surely signaled
publicly the absence of the revolutionary implications attributed
to the opinion by Ackerman. More importantly, in his opinion for
the Court in Erie, Justice Brandeis relied heavily on Justice
Stephen Field's late nineteenth-century dissent to an extension of Swift v. Tyson2 53 in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v.
Baugh2 ' as well as Justice Holmes's repeated criticisms of Swift
(joined by other justices) in the early twentieth century. 5
Though he does not concede its significance, Ackerman himself
includes Justice Brandeis's quote from Justice Holmes's earlier
critique that Swift was "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or re256
spectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."
The fact that Swift could be viewed as problematic in the late
nineteenth century in Justice Field's dissent, as well as in Justice Holmes's early twentieth-century dissents, suggests that the
reasons for overruling Swift did not have as much to do with the

249. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 370.
250. Id. at 371.
251. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938) (Butler, J., concurring).

252. See id. at 90.
253. 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1842).
254. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting), quoted in Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
255. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &

Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), cited in Erie, 304
U.S. at 79; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).

256. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 371 (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 79).
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New Deal as Ackerman supposes. Swift's overruling was the
culmination of a long period of questioning rather than a signal
of something revolutionary.
Darby is even more important to Ackerman's theory of
transformative opinions than Erie. Although the Court's decision
to uphold the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 was "utterly predictable" in Ackerman's estimation,
Darby is a "landmark" for Ackerman because "[iut was
unanimous." 2 57 The unanimity was important because,
Ackerman argues, "a constant stream of dissenting opinions
testify to the continuing relevance of the tradition."2 58
By making this argument, Ackerman hoists himself on his
own petard. By acknowledging that dissenting opinions reflect
"the continu[ed] relevance of ... tradition, "259 Ackerman concedes that the dissents to Lochnerism prior to the "switch in
time" were part of a tradition. If a majority adopts the same
reasoning as these dissents, it necessarily must belong to the
same tradition. Moreover, dissents are important to Ackerman
because "they will serve as a priceless resource should a new
President come into office responsive to the constitutional values
the dissenting tradition emphasizes." 2 0 This is, of course, precisely what happened: a litany of dissents set the stage for the
dismantlement of Lochnerism. The fact that its dismantlement
was reflected at some point in a unanimous opinion does not
necessarily say anything about the legitimacy or radicalism of
the dismantlement. For one thing, Justice McReynolds, the last
of the Four Horsemen to be on the Court at the time, joined in
the Court's opinion without dissenting.261 This surely sent another signal to the public that the Court's doctrine had not necessarily taken a turn that was completely incompatible with the
pre-1937 constitutional order. In any event, the fact that the
justices who adhered to Lochnerian thinking would die or retire
from the Court was inevitable; that these vacancies all arose
while Franklin Roosevelt was president was fortuitous.

257. Id. at 373.

258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Coleman v. Miller also fails to fit Ackerman's theory of transformative opinions. In Transformations, Ackerman argues that
Coleman recognized higher lawmaking outside of the formalities
of Article V.262 In Coleman, the Court refused to adjudicate a
challenge to the validity of a state legislature's ratification of a
proposed constitutional amendment, a vote that took place thirteen years after Congress had passed the amendment and
twelve years after the same state legislature had considered and
rejected it. 263 The Court ruled that the case presented a
nonjusticiable political question. 2" Ackerman argues that by
ruling the question to be political rather than legal, the Court legitimized non-Article V higher lawmaking in the form of the
New Deal.26 5
Ackerman's reading of Coleman is implausible for three reasons. First, by finding the question in the case to be political
rather than legal, the Court did not decide the case on the merits. It is thus misleading to argue that the Court had positively
approved of higher lawmaking outside of Article V; in fact, the
Court positively approved nothing. Second, Coleman was hardly
the Court's first recognition or application of the political question doctrine. Prior to Coleman, the Court had applied the political question doctrine in other constitutional contexts,2 66 and the
262. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 261-66.

263. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939).
264. See id. at 453-54. The Court stated that
the question of a reasonable time in many cases would involve, as in this

case it does involve, an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic, which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and
as to which it would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority to
assert judicial notice as the basis of deciding a controversy with respect
to the validity of an amendment actually ratified ....
[T]hese conditions
are appropriate for the consideration of the political departments of the
Government. The questions they involve are essentially political and not
justiciable.
Id.
265. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 263-66.

266. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (refusing to hear
a suit attempting to enjoin President Johnson's enforcement of the reconstruction
laws); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47 (1849) (refusing to decide the issue
because it was "to be settled by the political power"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
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Court in Coleman cited many of its earlier applications of the
political question doctrine to underscore that its decision to
extend the political question doctrine to the realm of higher
lawmaking was neither novel nor unusual.6 7 Third, and perhaps
most importantly, there is no precedent before or after Coleman
in which the Court has tinkered with the internal procedures of
the amendment process. Higher lawmaking is a subject whose
merits the Court has never addressed. Hence, in Coleman, the
Court was following its conventional stance with respect to such
lawmaking, i.e., leaving it entirely within the discretion of the
political branches to decide.
V. ACKERMAN'S PROPOSALS
Ackerman's synthesis does not lead him to conclude that the
American system of government is perfect.2 68 Instead, he accepts
that our democracy is imperfect and requires significant revision
to provide greater opportunity for the public to effect constitutional change. He makes two major proposals for facilitating
popular sovereignty in higher lawmaking. I assess each below.
A.

The Two-Thirds Requirement for Supreme Court

Appointments
Ackerman's suggested requirement of a supermajority vote for
Supreme Court nominations is designed to make Supreme Court
selection more democratic. It would accomplish this end by
changing the dynamics of Supreme Court appointments. It
would prevent "an ideological President with a weak mandate
[from using] a slim Senatorial majority to ram through a constitutional revolution." 26 9 To command the supermajority required
for confirmation, presidents would be forced "to consult with the
political opposition and select distinguished professionals who

constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.").
267. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 454-56.
268. See 2 ACKER AN, supra note 9, at 403-06.
269. Id. at 407.
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would adopt0 an evolutionary approach to constitutional inter27
pretation."
The two-thirds requirement poses, however, two problems for
Ackerman. The first is that it is important to Ackerman not only
for the change it would effect in the dynamics of Supreme Court
confirmation proceedings, but also for its symbolic value. In fact,
the vast majority of people who have been confirmed as Supreme Court justices have been confirmed with the support of
more than two-thirds of the Senate. 7 ' If the proposal would not
change the outcome of most Supreme Court confirmation proceedings, the only reason it would have appeal for Ackerman is
because it would signify something of great value to him-the
overcoming of some significant hurdle or obstacle that could
have been overcome only with widespread political support.
Ironically, the satisfaction of Article V's criteria for constitutional amendment signifies the very same thing. After all, it is Article V's formality that constitutes its most important feature. The
very fact that formal requirements have to be met in order for
an Article V amendment to exist is an important source-some
would say the only source-of an Article V amendments legitimacy. For Ackerman to insist that a Supreme Court appointment must have a similar pedigree of formality to achieve the
appropriate degree of legitimacy conflicts with the rest of
Ackerman's arguments, for one also could argue that complying
with the formal requirements of Article V would have greater
legitimacy than doing otherwise.
Ackerman's proposal undoubtedly would achieve its stated
objective of changing the dynamics of confirmation because each
senator would know that his or her vote would have added
weight under the new system. The ensuing problem is that in all
likelihood this would make the future of the confirmation pro-

270. Id.
271. Assuming arguendo that senators would have voted the same way on Supreme
Court nominees regardless of the rule, the rule would have prevented the confirmations of only a small number of justices-Clarence Thomas, William Rehnquist (for
Chief Justice), Mahlon Pitney, Lucius Lamar, Stanley Mathews, Nathan Clifford,
John Catron, and Roger Taney (for Chief Justice), each of whom had been confirmed
by less than a two-thirds vote of the Senate. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 322-38 (2d ed. 1996).
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cess unpredictable. We simply do not know whether a
supermajority vote would have kept a number of well-qualified
people off the Court in spite of their strong professional records.2 7 ' Nor would we know whether the supermajority vote

would enhance or impede popular sovereignty in the appointments of Supreme Court justices. Indeed, it is quite conceivable
that a hugely popular president still could fail to win confirmation of his or her extremely well-qualified nominee because of
some obstinate, unprincipled faction in the Senate.
Moreover, it is not clear why the supermajority requirement
necessarily would lead to the appointment of justices who would
follow a so-called "evolutionary approach to constitutional interpretation."27 The relationship between the supermajority requirement and the appointment of justices who favor a certain
approach to constitutional interpretation is by no means clear.
In other words, Ackerman fails to show why his proposed requirement necessarily would result in the appointment of justices with some (but not other) kinds of viewpoints regarding constitutional interpretation. Nor has Ackerman shown how the
appointment of justices who adhere to an "evolutionary approach
to constitutional interpretation" would represent a vindication of
the will of "We the People"; he has not shown that the American
people favor any particular approach to constitutional interpretation. Nor has he established why the "evolutionary approach
to constitutional interpretation" should be the preferred mode of
constitutional interpretation or be considered as better for the
country than other approaches. In addition, Ackerman assumes
that the supermajority requirement would dissuade a president
from nominating "constitutional visionaries," 2 7 but a president
disposed to find such a visionary might still find such a person
in the guise of a nominee who lacks a paper trail reflecting how
he or she would perform on the Court once confirmed. The fact

272. Conceivably, this rule might have led to different outcomes in the confirmation
proceedings for some distinguished but controversial Supreme Court nominees, such
as Charles Evans Hughes (for Chief Justice), Louis Brandeis, and Melville Fuller,
each of whom was confirmed by barely more than two-thirds of the Senate. See id.

273. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 407.
274. Id.
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that a nominee lacks a paper trail of an ideology does not mean
the person lacks or is not disposed to certain ideological viewpoints.
Indeed, it is conceivable that the proposal would, if adopted,
be much more likely to frustrate rather than facilitate the making of meritorious appointments. The more accomplished a Supreme Court nominee, the more likely the nominee has done or
said something in his or her distinguished professional life to
stir the opposition of some faction. The two-thirds requirement
empowers a small faction-at least one-third of the Senate-to
wield veto power over a Supreme Court nomination. Rather than
fulfill Ackerman's desire to ensure that confirmation of Supreme
Court nominees will occur only with the demonstration of overwhelming support, a nominee's opponents will find it much easier to oppose a Supreme Court nomination because they would
have to persuade fewer people than they have to convince at
present.
Ackerman also neglects to consider the Founders' reasons for
requiring a supermajority vote for removals and treaty
ratifications but not for confirmations. The Founders reserved a
two-thirds supermajority voting requirement to shift the presumption against certain matters they expected not to arise
routinely in order to ensure greater deliberation on them, to
decrease the chances for political or partisan reprisals on removals and treaty ratifications, and to protect an unpopular minority from being abused in Senate votes on these questions.2 7 5 The
Founders required a simple majority for confirmations in order
to balance the demands of relatively efficient staffing of the
government with the need to check the president's discretion (as
well as the composition or direction of the judiciary).2 7 6
B. The "PopularSovereignty Initiative"
The major problem with Ackerman's proposed "Popular Sovereignty Initiative" is that, as Ackerman recognizes, it probably

275. See GERHARDT, supra note 93, at 12-13.
276. See GERHARDT, supra note 111.
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would never be adopted. 7 The significance of this concession
should not be underestimated. If this proposal has no realistic
chance of being adopted, one should consider the reasons for its
likely failure. Deciphering those reasons will reveal a great deal
about the dynamics of constitutional change.
First, as Ackerman notes, the "popular sovereignty" proposal
would fail because state leaders would be predisposed not to
support the idea of excluding the sovereignty they represent
from the amendment process.27 It is likely, however, that many
federal officials would also be reluctant to accept the proposal.
Although it is possible that federal officials often support mechanisms that enhance their own authority, the problem in this instance is that they generally do not become federal officials
without significant support from party leaders and other constituencies in their home states. The strength of political parties
and local party leadership as a base for successful national politicians remains formidable. Ackerman's proposal does not, of
course, suggest doing away with this structure, but his proposal
has little or no chance for passage without its support. Of
course, there are other organizations, including interest groups
and the media, whose support makes a huge difference to political leaders, and any significant proposal for change must win
the approval of these groups as well.
Ackerman undoubtedly seeks to reduce the power of small
groups (e.g., political parties, states, interest groups, and the
media) over the interpretation, implementation, and amendment
of the Constitution. Such groups nonetheless continue to wield
enormous power. To illustrate this problem, one need look no
further than the latest formal addition to the Constitution-the
Twenty-seventh Amendment. The fact that the Twenty-seventh
Amendment could be adopted without significant public support
or awareness 279 says two important things about Ackerman's
thesis. The first is that, if we care about the need for greater
public participation in higher lawmaking, the newest
amendment's inclusion as part of the Constitution is disturbing,
277. See 2 ACKEnfAN, supra note 9, at 415.
278. See id.
279. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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for it demonstrates that higher lawmaking that arguably complies with the formalities of Article V can occur without public
awareness, interest, or support. It demonstrates further the
need to adopt incentives to ensure that government officials, the
media, and interest groups each do what they can to keep the
public adequately informed of mobilized efforts by some political
elites to make higher law.
The second lesson derived from the Twenty-seventh
Amendment's inclusion as an enduring part of the Constitution
is that increasing direct citizen participation in higher lawmaking, as suggested by Ackerman, is long overdue. One strategy for
overcoming the inertia of the political process and increasing
citizen participation is what Ackerman has already tried to do in
his second volume-that is, directly educating the public about
its potential to lead or to effectuate change or reform. The "Popular Sovereignty Initiative"' ° is one such approach to implement
this goal. For those who trust Congress or the states (more than
they trust the President) to represent accurately their views on
the need for constitutional reform, Ackerman's solution is obviously unattractive. Their alternative is either the system that
presently exists or a new amendment that would allow for direct
citizen input on higher lawmaking, such as through referenda.
The extent to which radical change of the sort just described
does not happen would be another illustration of the fact that
"We the People" do not have the power Ackerman claims we do.
CONCLUSION

In Transformations,the second volume of his projected threevolume series, Bruce Ackerman attempts to demonstrate how
the institutions of the national government interact with the
American people to transform the Constitution. According to
Ackerman, this interaction has produced a common law of higher lawmaking, the critical components of which are the principles and rules he derives from the public statements and actions
of national leaders, including the Supreme Court, during Reconstruction and the New Deal. Though his analysis is often provoc-

280. See 2 ACEERMAN, supra note 9, at 414-17.
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ative, it ultimately fails to achieve its desired objective. The very
sources on which Ackerman relies to establish his thesis do not
support a common law of higher lawmaking. To begin with, the
text of the Constitution recognizes no method for amending the
Constitution outside of Article V, and recognizing any such
method in the absence of explicit constitutional authorization
would render Article V (and other similar powers-granting provisions) superfluous. Also, the record of constitutional change suggests that it occurs in many different ways, some simpler, and
some more complex or subtle, than Ackerman's five phases of
higher lawmaking, but virtually no constitutional change has
occurred with the kind of public support, awareness, or input
Ackerman has supposed is a necessary prerequisite for higher
lawmaking. His five phases of higher lawmaking exist only as
an artificial framework superimposed on historical events. The
institutions of the national government, including the President,
Congress, and the Supreme Court, have neither recognized nor
endorsed a common law of higher lawmaking. Moreover,
Ackerman has yet to produce the historical record to substantiate his claim that the public played an integral role in leading or
specifically approving the constitutional changes embodied in
the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. Nor do judicial
opinions help Ackerman, for they uniformly fail to recognize
explicitly Reconstruction and the New Deal as constitutional
moments. Furthermore, the New Dealers never said a single
word about Reconstruction as a model for their efforts. Their
silence suggests that they understood that Reconstruction was
an Article V experience, not a constitutional moment to which
they might look for guidance and common law precedent. In
addition, for more than half a century the Court repeatedly has
insisted that its upholding of the constitutionality of the New
Deal is consistent with the pre-1937 constitutional order rather
than a recognition of a revolutionary upheaval of it.
None of this is meant to suggest that Ackerman's project is a
categorical failure. It does mean that Ackerman has thus far
failed to meet his objective of building a convincing case in favor
of the existence of a common law of higher lawmaking. One
more volume of his project remains. The purported focus will be
the ways in which the Supreme Court has preserved constitu-
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tional change, particularly the revolution embodied by the New
Deal. 8 ' The third volume also will provide him with another opportunity to deal comprehensively and responsibly with the
sources on which a common law of higher lawmaking should be
based. Until such time as Ackerman takes full advantage of this
chance and makes the requisite showing in the manner of the
good common law lawyer he purports to be, he will have failed
in his quest to explain the dynamics of higher lawmaking and
thus to provide an enduring moment of constitutional enlightenment.

281. See id. at 403.

